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chair’s foreword
the london finance commission provides an 
opportunity to improve the government of london. 
Initiated by the Mayor and supported by the boroughs, 
the commission has been able to consider the 
weaknesses of the existing system and to  propose 
improvements. this report makes proposals to build 
upon reform which has already taken place under 
successive governments. the commission believes that 
there would be more jobs and growth in london if the 
government of London had greater financial autonomy. 
Devolution and localism face little opposition apart from national politicians’ cautious 
approach to constitutional change in Britain. Although Scotland and Wales now enjoy 
substantial devolved power, England has not seen anything like the same degree of devolution. 
London has a relatively new system of city-wide government which, in the Commission’s view, 
could readily wield more power and fiscal autonomy.
London is a leading international city which has, somehow, become a model for free-wheeling, 
tolerant, metropolitan living. It has a fast-growing population and, along with its surrounding 
counties, one of the largest regional economies in the world. It cannot stand still. Other major 
cities are rapidly building metros, enhancing education facilities and developing new homes. 
Infrastructure is the key to continued economic success and a decent quality of life.
The Commission has sought evidence from a wide range of organisations and individuals. 
the message we received was clear and unanimous: london’s government needs to be given 
greater freedom to determine and use the resources raised from taxpayers. At present, 
London (and, indeed, England as a whole) is an extreme outlier compared with other cities and 
countries. Only a tiny proportion of the taxes raised in London are determined by the city’s 
government. Even after the reforms of April 2013, barely seven per cent of all the tax paid by 
London residents and businesses is retained by the Mayor and the boroughs. The equivalent 
figure in New York is over 50 per cent.
Commissioned research provided us with evidence about previous finance reviews, the 
potential economic impact of greater local autonomy, longer-term trends in taxation and 
public expenditure, the position of other global cities, and the situation in Scotland and Wales. 
While the impact of earlier national reviews was very limited, recent inquiries in Scotland and 
Wales are paving the way towards substantive fiscal devolution. Evidence about the impact 
of devolution on economic growth is ambiguous, though there is no suggestion that London 
would be likely to see slower growth if there were more local freedom over taxation and 
expenditure. Research commissioned by the City of London projects continuing relative growth 
in London’s tax yield and thus in its contribution to the rest of the UK. 
it is easy to assume that england’s centralised democracy is the only possible arrangement. 
Compared with other major countries, sub-national government in London has been 
infantilised by a long-term move over many decades to centralise public finance and tax-
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raising. The Mayor and the boroughs must rely on the Exchequer to redistribute almost all of 
the taxation paid in the city and to determine spending priorities. As a result, co-ordination 
which can deliver real results at a local level is lost. This is not a good situation for a developed 
democracy.
London’s population is equivalent to those of Scotland and Wales combined. Its economy 
is almost double the size of these nations together. Yet while the dynamic of devolution 
continues to offer new powers and financial freedoms to the governments in Edinburgh and 
Cardiff (and, indeed Belfast) there have been no proposals to increase the autonomy of London 
government. the commission has received no evidence as to why london and other english 
city regions cannot be afforded the kind of decentralised power offered to Scotland, Wales and 
northern ireland.
Hitherto, there have been a number of barriers to significant further devolution to London. 
First, public expenditure reviews currently work in such a way as to inhibit any deviation from 
individual departmental priorities or, indeed, overall Treasury control. Second, any substantive 
removal of london from Whitehall control would weaken departments and ministers; london 
is a large and interesting part of any spending department’s empire. Third, London and its 
region are so important to the UK economy that any threat to growth there would be seriously 
problematic for the British government.
Yet it is economic growth that the Commission sees as the potential prize of a further shift of 
financial and fiscal control to London. As the city population grows to nine and then ten million 
people by 2030, there will need to be massive investment in enabling infrastructure simply to 
accommodate these new residents and, indeed, commuters. Beyond this investment to keep 
pace with the population, the Commission is convinced that London would be better able 
to prioritise decisions about investment. Londoners know they need new railways, schools, 
homes, waste facilities and streets. Because of their day-to-day dependence on physical 
infrastructure, we believe london voters would be more likely than voters elsewhere in Britain 
to prioritise spending on longer-term investments.
If London had enhanced fiscal capacity to back such investment, there could be an enhanced 
level of capital spending which would, in turn, produce additional growth and tax yield. London 
government could then re-invest higher tax revenues in more infrastructure; a virtuous circle 
would be created. of course, it is important to acknowledge that with greater autonomy there 
would be greater risk.
London is not a city state. But it could have a greater degree of self-government and thus, in 
our view, be better governed. The same is true for other city regions. No one can seriously 
any longer believe that Whitehall always knows best. this report makes the case for a further, 
logical step towards a stronger and more productive system of London government. If reform 
is successful, the results would be good for london but also good for the rest of the country. 
The time has come for a more autonomous and accountable model of funding for the city.  
Any devolution to London of powers over taxation, financial management or expenditure 
would have implications for both the Mayor and the boroughs. It is difficult to imagine a 
change that did not affect both parts of the city’s government, or which might not have 
implications for longer-term relationships between City Hall and the boroughs, collectively 
and individually. With this in mind, we envisage the Mayor and London Councils creating a 
more formal mechanism for handling any transfer of taxation powers and/or responsibilities 
for expenditure. In any such mechanism, both parts of London’s government would have 
to be represented and have the ability to ensure that there was agreement about how new 
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responsibilities were handled in the longer term. This is not to say that a particular tax could 
not be given wholly to the Mayor or wholly to the boroughs. But in making any such decision 
in response to devolution of taxation or other powers by central government, each part of 
London government would need to assent to the broad structure and its mode of operation.  
The London Finance Commission has been a collaboration of its members and a number of 
officers at City Hall and London Councils. A number of individuals worked on research, data 
analysis and refining proposals. The Commission is thus indebted to John O’Brien, Hugh 
Grover, Jon Rowney, Nigel Minto and Dick Sorabji at London Councils and, at City Hall, Jeff 
Jacobs, Martin Clarke, Martin Mitchell, Matthew Waite, Gordon Douglass, Tom Middleton 
and Salima Khatun. The officials most closely involved in the day-to-day management and 
delivery of the report were Jeremy Skinner and Julia Harrowsmith, without whom nothing 
would have been possible.
Tony Travers 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
May 2013
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Executive Summary
the commission’s report recommends that funding arrangements in london should 
allow London government to make additional self-determined investments in its own 
infrastructure both to cater for the growth already forecast for its population and economy, 
and to promote additional economic growth. Relaxing restrictions on borrowing for capital 
investment while retaining prudential rules and simultaneously devolving the full suite 
of property tax revenue streams would afford London government greater autonomy to 
invest in the capital. such reforms would also increase london government’s accountability 
to residents and businesses. Change would be achieved without affecting the financial 
settlements of other parts of the country.
Part 1: introduCtion and BaCkground
The Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, established the Commission in July 2012 to investigate 
funding arrangements in the capital. members came from a wide a variety of backgrounds, 
including parliament, the london assembly, Whitehall, think tanks, the private sector, 
public finance bodies, London local authorities (both political and executive leaders), and 
from other major UK cities (Birmingham and Manchester). We were invited to examine the 
potential for greater devolution of both taxation and the control of resources in London, 
and to develop options to improve the city’s tax and spending arrangements, in particular 
to promote jobs and growth. 
We agreed to judge any options we were considering against five core principles: 
accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness, autonomy and fairness. These 
principles underpin good government and, we believe, are prerequisites for promoting 
jobs and growth. We have been keen to base all our work on evidence and to develop 
recommendations with cross-party support.
Part 2: evidenCe
We invited oral and written evidence from a number of experts and stakeholders so as 
to gather views and insights into matters relating to fiscal devolution. Although opinions 
varied, most submissions acknowledged how centralised the current system had 
become and recognised the impediments it presents to local autonomy and, accordingly, 
to local growth.
Overall, the body of existing academic evidence was inconclusive about the impact of 
devolving fiscal powers. There is no consistent and certain evidence that either centralised 
or, on the other hand, devolved models of government have measurable effects on 
economic growth. However, the comparative research we commissioned from the 
University of Toronto helped us to understand how municipal governments function in a 
number of major international cities, demonstrating that London, and by implication other 
British cities, have very low levels of fiscal autonomy. The Toronto research suggested that 
although fiscal devolution can entail risks, London would benefit from having more revenue 
streams under its control. 
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This body of evidence formed the basis of our subsequent deliberations, placing our own work 
in the context of previous reviews of a similar nature, comparing London with international cities 
and the devolved nations of the UK. It offered us greater insights into the possible effects of fiscal 
devolution, as well as demonstrating a broad consensus about greater fiscal powers for London.
Part 3: suPPorting london and uk growth
London’s strong demographic and economic growth is forecast to continue. We argue that 
a failure to invest in the city would hamper this growth. providing for london’s forecast 
population and economic growth, as well as promoting additional economic growth beyond this 
baseline, will require above all else sustained investment in all kinds of infrastructure, not least 
in transport, schools, housing, energy supply and technology. 
in order to understand london’s infrastructure needs we recommend that the government 
should require the Mayor, London Councils and the London Enterprise Panel to develop and 
maintain a long-term, high-level capital investment plan for the city, in association with the 
London boroughs. This plan should set out the costs of strategic investment options and match 
them to the resources available, both now and in a more devolved future. an investment plan 
would help show gaps in available funding, and, indirectly, help to clarify further roles and 
responsibilities. This work should be done with the support and involvement of Infrastructure 
UK at the national level and the boroughs at the local level, including the information prepared 
for community infrastructure levies.
However, beyond assessing need, structural problems with financing infrastructure must also 
be addressed. Existing funding models for basic infrastructure such as schools and housing 
are inadequate to cope with predicted growth and, for larger items, they are complicated 
and protracted. For example, securing funding for Crossrail entailed two decades of complex 
negotiations before final decisions were made. 
London government needs fewer borrowing constraints and greater devolved tax powers to 
enable it to invest more comprehensively without the need for ad hoc, project-by-project 
financing arrangements. Consequently, we propose that the Greater London Authority (GLA) 
Group borrowing ceilings be removed (while retaining prudential borrowing rules), and that no 
further constraints be imposed on local authorities. 
A mechanism will be required to ensure that any reform made to London’s fiscal and financing 
arrangements are not negated by central government periodically adjusting grant resources 
available to the city.
We further propose the Government relax Tax Increment Finance restrictions. Also, we suggest 
that borrowing which will be used to promote growth or reduce public expenditure and thus be 
repaid should be distinguished from other kinds of debt. 
We make number of recommendations about the need to improve the supply of housing, 
including a proposal that local authority borrowing limits for housing purposes be relaxed or 
removed, within prudential borrowing rules.
Part 4: fisCal Powers
Fewer borrowing restrictions must be accompanied by devolved revenue streams under the 
control of london government. not only would this increase its autonomy to invest, levelling 
the playing field with other international cities, it would make London government more 
accountable to its residents and businesses and in this way promote economic growth and 
provide other benefits. 
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Property taxes should be devolved first, as they have immobile bases and are therefore well 
suited to local control. We recommend that the full suite (council tax, business rates, stamp 
duty land tax, annual tax on enveloped dwellings and capital gains property disposal tax) 
should be devolved to london government, which should then have devolved responsibility 
for setting the tax rates and authority over all matters including revaluation, banding and 
discounts. The yields of these taxes should be offset through corresponding reductions in 
grant to ensure a fiscally neutral position for the Exchequer, at the outset. Not least because 
the yield from property taxes is already high in London, devolution will lead to much greater 
pressure on london government to account to residents and businesses alike for the 
activities the tax revenues fund.
In addition to these devolved taxes, London government should be able to introduce new 
smaller taxes. Although unlikely to increase revenue substantially, they could be used as 
useful policy levers to promote economic development or other aims. 
another priority is for local government to be able to recover full costs, even for charges set 
at the national level. In general it should be able to set fees and charges for all discretionary 
services if it so chooses, thus allowing it the flexibility to respond to local needs. Such 
changes have clear potential to promote growth, for example by encouraging development 
through improved planning applications services. 
We acknowledge and support the merits of existing initiatives such as Community Budgets 
and City Deals, which increase local control of resources, and we welcome Lord Heseltine’s 
proposals to increase the involvement of leps in spending decisions. We encourage 
further initiatives of this nature, and consider that there may be a greater role for London 
government in the design and decision making process.
Part 5: relationshiPs within and outside london
The proposals we make seek to increase the fiscal powers of London government. Clearly, 
this will require robust governance mechanisms between London’s different sections and 
tiers of government, which have a strong interest in working together. While it is beyond our 
remit as a Commission to say how our recommendations should be governed, we accept the 
governance principles agreed by gla and london councils, which state amongst other things 
that the interests of the mayor cannot be overridden by the boroughs or vice versa, and that 
the system must enforce binding decisions which must reflect clear consensus.
The powers of the London Assembly must also be reconsidered and potentially augmented 
as and when the mayor of london’s powers grow.
the agreed governance principles are consistent with our own aim to ensure fair outcomes 
for all parts of the capital and the country. in accordance, we have designed all our 
recommendations such that when they are introduced, the rest of the UK will not be put at 
a disadvantage. The devolution of taxation will be met with a pound-for-pound reduction 
in grant and most of our recommendations or similar options could, and in our view should, 
operate well in England’s other big cities.
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Recommendations
london government should have the freedom to make appropriate investments in its own 
infrastructure both to cater for the growth already forecast for its population and economy, 
and to promote additional economic growth. Relaxing restrictions on borrowing for capital 
investment within prudential rules and devolving revenue streams, including from the full 
suite of property taxes, will afford London government the autonomy to invest in the capital 
and increase its accountability to London’s residents and businesses, without affecting the 
financial settlements of other parts of the country (Part 3, Chapter 1).
Planning the infrastruCture needed for a growing City
the mayor of london should have a responsibility to be a champion of all infrastructure 
planning for the capital, but should also look wherever possible to delegate powers to 
london’s boroughs to act as commissioners of local infrastructure projects, thereby increasing 
the overall infrastructure capacity across the capital (Part 3, Chapter 1).
The Government should require the Mayor, working with London Councils, the boroughs 
and the London Enterprise Panel, to develop and maintain a long-term, high level capital 
investment plan for the city. This should set out the costs of strategic investment options 
and match them to the resources available both now and in a more devolved future  
(Part 3, Chapter 1).
The Mayor should be required to report progress against this plan to increase accountability. 
This exercise would help bring out gaps in available funding and, indirectly, help to 
clarify further roles and responsibilities. Such work should be done with the support and 
involvement of Infrastructure UK at the national level and the boroughs at the local level (Part 
3, Chapter 1).
The Government should require the utility regulators to have regard to the London Plan 
and the high level investment plan recommended here in consultation with business,  
(Part 3, Chapter 1).
allowing investMent to generate eConoMiC growth
The Government and London should explore more radical approaches to building incentives 
for London government into the tax system (Part 3, Chapter 2).
The Government should distinguish between borrowing that will be used to promote growth 
or reduce public expenditure and thus be repaid, and other kinds of debt (Part 3, Chapter 2).
In light of the robust and effective prudential borrowing regime, GLA Group borrowing ceilings 
should be removed (Part 3, Chapter 2).
The Government should continue to allow London local authorities to take independent 
borrowing and investment decisions within the prudential code, imposing no further 
constraints (Part 3, Chapter 2).
The Mayor and London’s local authorities should determine which Tax Increment Financing 
(TIF) projects to proceed with, within the prudential borrowing code. The potential for 
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locally led TIFs would be increased through the devolved fiscal measures we propose in Part 
4. Meanwhile, the Government should start with a presumption in favour of funding all TIF 
projects that can demonstrate net gains to the public finances as a whole (through, at the 
national and/or local level, increasing the tax yield or reducing public expenditure or both) 
after adjusting for risk (Part 3, Chapter 2).
housing finanCe
Borrowing limits for housing purposes for boroughs should be relaxed or removed. 
Prudential borrowing rules would still apply, as would the rigour of long-term Housing 
Revenue account (hRa) business plans (Part 3, Chapter 2).
The devolution of housing benefit (or a related share of Universal Credit) to London should be 
considered, and necessary transitional arrangements explored (Part 3, Chapter 2).
Measures to shift public funding from personal subsidy to investment in built assets should be 
further explored. This will require an appropriate capital settlement for London from central 
government in future Spending Reviews and Budgets. It will also require appropriate revenue 
funding for the transition phase (Part 3, Chapter 2).
taxation
The full suite of property taxes (council tax, business rates, stamp duty land tax, annual tax 
on enveloped dwellings and capital gains property development tax) should be devolved to 
London government, which should have devolved responsibility for setting the tax rates and 
authority over all matters including revaluation, banding and discounts (Part 4, Chapter 3).
doMestiC ProPerty taxes
Council tax should be retained as a local tax but London government should be given the 
power and be required to hold periodic revaluations (undertaken by the Valuation Office, 
according to national practice), to determine the number of bands, to set the ratio of tax from 
band to band and to set the tax rate. A fully localised council tax of this kind would be part of a 
suite of local property taxes determined by London government (Part 4, Chapter 3).
NoN-domestic pRopeRty taxes
100 per cent of business rates should be devolved to london government, through an 
appropriate governance mechanism, including the responsibility for the timing of revaluations. 
London government should be free to determine such issues as discounts and tax breaks, 
and should have the freedom to use business rates to undertake ‘Enterprise Zone’-style 
interventions (Part 4, Chapter 3).
At such a time that business rates were wholly retained in London, alongside other property 
taxes (as we recommend), London government should set the business rate multiplier in 
London, again in consultation with appropriate stakeholders (Part 4, Chapter 3).
if business rates are localised in the way we propose then london government should put in 
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place a scheme that would protect ratepayers from any perceived risk of unreasonably high 
rate increases, in consultation with business (Part 4, Chapter 3).
Further assessment should be undertaken of the potential benefits and costs of new taxes 
such as those on undeveloped land as part of the wider reforms of property taxation that we 
advocate (Part 4, Chapter 3).
inCoMe tax
If greater powers are devolved to London over time, the assignment of income tax should be 
considered and should be viewed alongside more effective Community Budget or ‘single pot’ 
arrangements (Part 4, Chapter 4).
sMaller taxes
London government should be able to introduce smaller new taxes. The government should 
pass permissive legislation that would make such changes straightforward to implement  
(Part 4, Chapter 4).
grant reduCtions to offset new tax Powers
The yields of newly devolved taxes should be offset through corresponding reductions in grant 
to ensure a fiscally neutral position for the Exchequer (and the rest of the UK) at the outset 
(Part 4, Chapter 3).
ProteCting london’s Position in the longer terM
A mechanism is required that will ensure that any reforms made to London’s fiscal and 
financing arrangements are not negated by central government periodically adjusting grant 
resources available to the city beyond the reduction required at the point of reform to ensure 
there is no shift of resources between London and the rest of the UK (Part 3, Chapter 2).
fees and Charges
The number of nationally set charges should be kept to a minimum; locally determined charges 
should be the norm (Part 4, Chapter 5).
Local authorities should be able to recover full costs, even for charges set at the national level 
(Part 4, Chapter 5).
Central controls should be removed on planning application fees, building control charges, land 
searches and licencing fees (Part 4, Chapter 5).
in the longer term, london government should be responsible for administering any 
introduction of road charging that may replace vehicle excise duty, and yields should be 
retained locally (Part 4, Chapter 5).
CoMMunity Budgets and City deals
Central government should extend the remit and scale of Community Budget Pilots through 
‘single pots’ devolved from existing Whitehall budgets (Part 4, Chapter 2).
in our recommended model of london government, the mayor of london should work with 
boroughs and groups of boroughs to create ‘City Deal’-type initiatives within London  
(Part 4, Chapter 2).
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1 Introduction and  Background
In Part 1 we explain the circumstances in which the 
Commission was established, detail its approach to 
its objectives and situate its work in the context of 
previous comparable reviews. 
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paRt 1, chapteR 1 
Introduction and background  
to the commission
1. this chapter provides an account of how the london finance commission was set up and a 
description of its remit, and approach to its work.
origin of the CoMMission
2. The London Finance Commission was established by the Mayor of London after his  
re-election in May 2012, in relation to manifesto commitments to ensure improved 
funding arrangements for london.
3. Professor Tony Travers of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) 
was appointed chair of the Commission in June 2012 and its members were drawn from 
different political parties, the private sector and relevant professions from across and 
outside london1. the members were: 
• John Biggs (london assembly member for city & east)
• Roger Bright (former Chief Executive, the Crown Estate)
• chris duffield (former Town Clerk and Chief Executive, City of London)
• mike emmerich (Chief Executive, New Economy Manchester)
• steve Freer (Chief Executive, CIPFA)
• Nick holgate (Town Clerk and Executive Director of Finance, Royal Borough  
 of Kensington and chelsea)
• stephen hughes (Chief Executive, Birmingham City Council)
• alexandra Jones (Chief Executive, Centre for Cities)
• Gerald Jones (former Chief Executive, Wandsworth Council)
• sir stuart Lipton (partner, lipton Rogers) 
• teresa o’Neill (Vice Chair, London Councils)
• Jules pipe (chair, london councils)
• Nick Raynsford (mp for greenwich and Woolwich)
• Ben Rogers (director, centre for london)
• Bridget Rosewell (Senior Partner, Volterra Partners)
• martin smith (Chief Executive, London Borough of Ealing)
Please see Annex 1 for biographies.
4. the commission was set up to work independently of the mayor and to report to him 
in spring 2013. It met for the first time in July 2012 and subsequently met monthly until 
april 2013.
1 Ex officio members were: Jeff Jacobs (Head of Paid Service and Executive Director, GLA), Ed Lister (GLA Chief of Staff and 
Deputy Mayor for Planning) and Dr Gerard Lyons (Chief Economic Advisor to the Mayor of London). Official observers were: 
Martin Clarke (Executive Director, Resources, GLA), Steve Allen (Managing Director, Finance, TfL), John O’Brien (Chief Executive, 
London Councils) and Jeremy Skinner (Senior Manager, Economic and Business Policy, GLA). Clerk to the Commission was: Julia 
Harrowsmith (Senior Policy Officer, Economic and Business Policy, GLA).
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reMit
5. The purpose of the Commission was to examine the potential for greater devolution of 
both taxation and the control of resources in London and to develop options to improve 
London’s tax and spending arrangements, in particular to promote jobs and growth. 
The Terms of Reference set a number of objectives: to describe and assess current 
funding arrangements in London, to examine the scale and distribution of London’s 
public expenditure, to examine options for change and to make recommendations to the 
mayor. Please see Annex 2 for Terms of Reference. 
6. In correspondence with the chair of the Commission, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
George Osborne, expressed support for the Commission and stated that “under 
the right conditions, fiscal devolution has the potential to increase the financial 
accountability of local government and promote additional growth.” We accepted 
his suggestion that proposals should be judged against three tests: they should be 
based on evidence, they should have cross-party support and they should be without 
detriment to the rest of the UK. 
7. While the purposes and objectives of the Commission include consideration of both 
capital and revenue, in the main our work, deliberation and recommendations have 
focused more on capital issues and the need for infrastructure investment to support 
london’s economic growth. this priority should not give the impression that we 
undervalue the importance of revenue funding and spending for services such as social 
care and recycling and waste collection. It is a given that, in the context of the current 
and future economic climate, core services delivered by, in the main, london’s boroughs 
must not be adversely affected by any of our proposals.
8. Any proposals of the type put forward by the Commission in this report require fair, 
robust and resilient governance structures and mechanisms that ensure that the 
distribution of tax burden and benefit falls equitably across London’s residents and 
businesses. the principles that would underlie the new structures and mechanisms that 
would be needed are discussed in more detail in part 5, chapter 2. 
9. We recognise this will involve agreement about what it would be appropriate for:
• the Mayor/Greater London Authority (GLA) to determine alone
• the Mayor/GLA and boroughs to determine collectively
• the Mayor/GLA and groups of boroughs to determine collectively
• groups of boroughs to determine collectively
• individual boroughs to determine alone.
10. Such arrangements could be complex. While it is not for the Commission to determine 
the exact nature of the governance structures, we would strongly encourage simplicity 
as far as possible.
aPProaCh of the CoMMission
11. In order to meet our objectives, we collected evidence, carried out stakeholder 
engagement events and deliberated findings over a number of months as the basis for 
developing recommendations.
12. We commissioned a series of research papers, exploring issues related to devolution 
such as feasibility, political and financial context and international models. GLA officers 
carried out much of the work with support from London Councils. Experts from Oxford 
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Economics (commissioned by the City of London) and the University of Toronto’s Institute 
on municipal finance and governance were engaged for specialist subjects.
13. We made a call for written evidence in September 2012. The responses we received 
provided evidence from a range of stakeholders from institutions inside and outside 
London, including London boroughs, London Councils, business organisations and the 
voluntary sector. 
14. We hosted three public oral evidence sessions from october to december 2012. these 
sessions allowed the Commission to hear the differing views of a number of experts from 
a range of backgrounds and to enter into dialogue with them. 
15. the chair of the commission addressed wider audiences about its work on a number 
of occasions. a focus group event was held at the london chamber of commerce and 
industry (lcci), a seminar for academics, students and the public was held at the lse and 
Centre for Cities hosted an expert seminar attended by representatives from think tanks, 
business and government. The chair addressed the Chief Executives’ London Committee 
(CELC), the London Councils Leaders’ Committee, the London Assembly, the London 
enterprise panel (lep) and other audiences.
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paRt 1, chapteR 2 
UK devolution in context
1. this chapter describes current government arrangements in scotland, Wales and greater 
London and provides an account of devolutionary developments there. It makes brief 
reference to the northern ireland assembly. 
2. Clear differences in form, function and funding exist between the GLA and the 
devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales. The latter were built on the concept of 
nationhood and grew out of existing government infrastructure, with devolution bringing 
devolved democracy to arrangements that were mostly already in place. By contrast, 
greater london had been without any metropolitan government for fourteen years 
when the office of the Mayor and the London Assembly came into being in 2000; the GLA 
did not recreate the Greater London Council, its institutional predecessor was abolished 
in 1986, but has become a unique institution in UK government. 
3. Yet in spite of their obvious differences, the GLA and the devolved national 
administrations form part of the same devolutionary movement. Comparisons can 
be useful as they exemplify how different devolved government structures can 
function within the UK, and highlight the dynamic nature of these institutions and 
their incremental development over time. Reforms that have occurred since 1999 also 
demonstrate that radical change can and has occurred in the UK. 
sCotland 
4. Until 1999 the Scottish Office (a part of the UK government and answering to the 
Secretary of State for Scotland) operated a degree of administrative devolution in 
Scotland that distinguished it from England and Wales. Following a referendum in 1997 
in which 74 per cent of the population voted in favour of further devolution, the Scotland 
Act 1998 established the Scottish Parliament, which was officially convened in July 1999. 
the parliament comprises 129 directly elected members and provided for a first minister 
to be nominated by the Scottish Parliament to lead the Scottish Executive (officially 
referred to as the Scottish Government since August 2007), supported by a number 
of ministers and accountable to the Scottish Parliament. Devolved responsibilities 
include health, education, justice and policing, rural affairs, economic development and 
transport, and control over local government (including council tax and non-domestic 
rates, henceforth referred to as ‘business rates’). The administration was funded through 
a block grant from central government, based on the Barnett Formula, and it had the 
option to raise additional revenue through the Scottish Variable Rate of income tax. This 
power allowed the Scottish Government to vary the basic rate of income tax on earned 
income in Scotland by up to 3 pence in the pound in either direction. 
5. The Commission on Scottish Devolution (‘the Calman Commission’) deliberated in 
2008-09. Accountable to both the Scottish and Westminster Parliaments, it produced 
two reports, concluding that while scotland had wide spending powers, it should have 
substantially greater control over raising the revenues that make up the Scottish Budget. 
the scotland act 2012 (henceforth referred to as ‘the scotland act’) implemented many 
of the Calman Commission’s proposals, including making substantial changes to the 
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Scottish Government’s funding arrangements, such that Scotland will move to raising 
approximately 35 per cent of its income when the reforms have been phased in. 
6. Changes to funding in Scotland are significant. From 2016, a new Scottish rate of income 
tax will be calculated by reducing the basic, higher and additional rates of income tax 
levied by central government by 10 pence in the pound and adding a new equivalent 
Scottish rate to be set by the Scottish Parliament. A new Scottish tax on land transactions 
to replace UK stamp duty land tax (henceforth referred to as ‘stamp duty’) will be 
introduced in 2015, as well as a new Scottish landfill tax to replace the UK equivalent. 
The Act also allows for new taxes to be created in Scotland and for additional taxes to be 
devolved in future. The block grant, still calculated according to the Barnett formula, will 
be reduced by an amount equivalent to the revenues from devolved taxes. 
7. The Act also enhances the borrowing powers of Scottish ministers in relation to capital 
expenditure, subject to HM Treasury controls and limits. A Scottish cash reserve will 
be introduced alongside these powers, which will manage fluctuations caused by the 
devolution of tax receipts. HM Treasury ran a consultation in autumn 2012 about Scotland 
being given powers to issue its own bonds.
8. A referendum about Scottish independence has been confirmed for September 
2014, in which a simple ‘yes/no’ question as to whether or not Scotland should be an 
independent country will be put to the Scottish electorate. Confirmation of the terms 
of the referendum put an end to speculation that a third option for full fiscal autonomy 
(commonly referred to as ‘devo max’) would be offered as an option, but it does not 
preclude further devolution, short of full independence, in the future.
wales
9. The National Assembly for Wales was given broadly the same powers as those previously 
held by the secretary of state for Wales in agriculture, culture, media and sport, economic 
development, education, environment, health, local government, housing, social services, 
trade and industry, training and transport. the assembly was also given the power to pass 
secondary legislation, such that it could only vary existing laws in its areas of competence, 
and then only within the scope of the legislation authorised by the UK Parliament. 
10. The structure of the Welsh Assembly was changed in 2006 to make separate the legislative 
and executive functions. It was also granted limited primary legislative powers, ‘Assembly 
Measures’, in areas within the legislative competency of the Assembly, which were 
further strengthened after a referendum, provided for in the Wales Act 2006, was held 
in 2011 about whether or not Wales should have full primary legislative powers. In the 
referendum, the Welsh electorate voted in favour of further powers being devolved to 
allow the Welsh Assembly to pass primary legislation in devolved areas of competence.
11. despite incremental changes to the powers and structure of the Welsh assembly, the 
Welsh Government has no tax raising powers and changes in its budget are set by 
the application of the Barnett Formula. However, it does have responsibility for local 
government’s business rates and council tax. It sets the business rate relief rate and the 
rate of increase in business rates each year (the multiplier), and has the ability to conduct 
council tax revaluations in Wales and to cap local authority council tax increases if it 
deems necessary. the independent commission on funding and finance for Wales (‘the 
Holtham Commission’) was established by the Welsh Government in 2008 to investigate 
options for change. The Commission on Devolution in Wales (‘the Silk Commission’), 
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which was set up by the Welsh and UK governments in 2011 with the support of the 
Welsh Government and Welsh political parties in the Assembly, further considered tax 
devolution and borrowing drawing on the Holtham Report. Silk’s 2012 report looked into 
ways to improve the financial accountability of the Assembly. In broad agreement with 
Holtham, Silk’s first report recommended that stamp duty, landfill duty, aggregates duty 
and potentially air passenger duty for long haul flights should be devolved to Wales. Silk 
also proposed that responsibility for income tax should be shared between the Welsh and 
UK governments, that the Welsh government should have sole responsibility for business 
rates and also that the Welsh government should have the capacity to borrow for capital 
investment on a prudent basis and to an extent for current spending (subject to limits 
agreed with HM Treasury.) It also recommended other matters such as improved financial 
information and a Welsh Treasury function.  
12. The Government will respond to Silk’s first report in spring 2013 and at time of printing it 
remains unclear if, when and how implementation will take place. The Silk Commission will 
produce a second report reviewing the powers of the National Assembly for Wales and 
recommending modifications to the present constitutional arrangements. The operation 
of the Barnett Formula in Wales is being reviewed through a separate bilateral process 
between central government and the Welsh government and progress was announced in 
october 2012.
northern ireland
13. The Northern Ireland Assembly reflects a unique political reality that distinguishes it from 
other devolved administrations in the UK, such that its organisational structure places 
great emphasis on power sharing and consensus. The institution has legislative powers 
in a number of areas, including education, health, environment, trade and investment 
and justice. It has no significant tax-raising powers and its block grant is determined 
through the Barnett Formula, though it has lobbied the Government to be able to adjust 
corporation tax rates in Northern Ireland in order to compete with lower rates in the 
Republic of Ireland. Uniquely in the UK, the poll tax and council tax were never introduced 
in Northern Ireland, which operates a rating system of domestic properties based on a full 
range of capital values (but subject to an upper cap).
london
14. London’s city-wide government was established by the GLA Act 1999. It comprises a 
directly elected Mayor and an elected Assembly of 25 members with scrutiny powers. It 
was created as a unique structure, a strategic authority with few direct service delivery 
powers but responsibility for transport, policing, fire and rescue, development and 
strategic planning. The GLA’s services are mostly delivered by functional bodies, not 
directly by City Hall. The Mayor was given powers of appointment and/or direction over 
these functional bodies, chairing Transport for London (TfL) and the Metropolitan Police 
Authority, since reformed to become the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, and the 
ability to set their budgets. 
15. The GLA was originally prohibited from spending on education, health, social services 
or housing, though it had limited influence over the way national housing programmes 
directed spending. its powers have since changed. the gla act 2007 increased the 
number of statutory strategies in new policy areas and introduced additional supervisory 
roles for the Mayor. The Localism Act 2011 conferred additional expenditure powers on 
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the GLA in relation to housing and regeneration, removing previous restrictions. However, 
spending restrictions on education (with the exception of academies), health and social 
services remain.
16. The powers and remit of the GLA are less than those of the Scottish and Welsh 
administrations, and the way it is funded is also very different. Unlike in Scotland and 
Wales, the Barnett Formula is not applied in London. Rather, the GLA Group budget 
is funded by a mixture of central government grant (34 per cent of its overall income 
in 2013-14), fares and other charges (50 per cent, of which the majority comes from 
transport fares), the council tax precept (7 per cent), retained business rates (8 per cent) 
and the use of reserves (1 per cent). 
17. Grant is subject to change on a periodic basis and often involves protracted negotiations 
with government. The Barnett Formula, by contrast, automatically adjusts the resources 
available to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in relation to change in the UK total. 
18. From 2013-14 the existing GLA grant for the GLA’s own activities is being reformed in 
such a way as to give the mayor greater autonomy over the use of gla group funding. 
However the dynamics of the new arrangements will still be controlled by ministers so 
the dependence on government decision-making will remain. In addition, government 
departments, notably the Department for Transport in relation to TfL, expect the GLA to 
‘passport’ on income which was previously paid as a specific grant, further limiting the 
flexibilities available.
loCal authorities 
19. The structure, functions and funding arrangements of local authorities in England have 
been restructured frequently since the 1960s. Outside London, a mixture of single and 
two-tier arrangements exists. London’s 32 boroughs are unitary authorities that have 
broadly the same powers and responsibilities as councils elsewhere, with some strategic 
oversight by the GLA. The City of London has exceptional arrangements. 
20. Local authorities were for many years funded mainly through central government grant. 
The rest of their income was made up of revenues from council tax, business rates and 
fees and charges. Recent changes to the financing of local authorities include those 
made in the Local Government Finance Act 2012, which introduced the local retention of 
business rates. as a result of this reform, from april 2013 councils will retain 50 per cent of 
their business rate yield. The Localism Act 2011 gives local authorities some discretion to 
offer business rate discounts while also introducing the requirement for a referendum to 
be held if council tax rises above centrally set limits. 
21. the act also made provision for the brokering of city deals, which allow bespoke 
governance and finance arrangements to be agreed between central government and 
individual cities. The Manchester City Deal’s ‘Earn Back’ model demonstrates the most 
radical example of financial freedom, allowing the ten Greater Manchester authorities 
jointly to retain part of the uplift in the local tax yield in addition to the business rate 
if such an uplift can be shown to be additional and as a result of local investment in 
infrastructure. The ‘Earn Back’ deal is the first example of its kind in England. 
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paRt 1, chapteR 3 
summary of previous reviews
1. This chapter provides a description of previous reviews of local government finance and a 
summary of key recommendations and reforms. 
2. The London Finance Commission is by no means the first review of its kind. Since the 
1970s several major inquiries into funding for local and regional government have 
been undertaken. Overall these reviews have not led to substantive reform, but have 
contributed to modest changes such as the 2013 business rate reforms and city deals. 
3. We considered it important to situate our Commission within the context of evolving 
UK devolution and a long history of similar reviews. We are aware of the centralising 
tendency that was prevalent during the period that these reviews took place. however, 
with more recent steps towards devolution in Wales and Scotland, and ‘pro-local’ 
sentiments in England, we believe there is another and perhaps more promising 
opportunity this time for London to lead the way.
the KiLBRaNdoN commissioN 1969 – 1973
4. The Royal Commission on the Constitution (the ‘Kilbrandon Commission’) was set 
up by Government to look into the UK’s constitutional arrangements, including local 
government. its primary focus was scotland and Wales, and though it considered the 
constitutional status of Cornwall, London was not examined separately from the rest of 
english local government.
5. The most tangible effects of this review were felt in terms of the debate about the 
governance of scotland and Wales rather than the governance of regional or local 
authorities in England2. the commission rejected the idea of england being considered 
an equivalent ‘region’ to Scotland and Wales but a minority of members favoured the 
idea of regional assemblies. london, it was proposed, would be part of a ‘south east’ 
region. This proposal was not acted upon at the time; it was resurrected in a different 
form during a later Government’s period of devolutionary fervour in the late 1990s. 
However, the impetus for devolution in England lost vigour when the North East rejected 
regional government in a referendum in 2004. 
2 In 1977, the Government published a white paper (‘Devolution: Financing the Devolved Services White Paper’, July 1977, Cmnd 
6890) about its proposals for funding the devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales, which it proposed to create as a result 
of the Kilbrandon Report. Although devolution did not occur on this occasion, the White Paper remains interesting as a way of 
understanding the deep conservatism of Governments over many years. Having made proposals for devolution to Scotland and 
Wales, this official document made only limited proposals for the devolution of financial powers. The White Paper explained the 
government’s reasons “for preferring a system based on expenditure needs rather than revenue-raising capacity”. it discussed 
“the scope for conferring some limited tax powers on the devolved administrations to enable them to supplement the block funds” 
before going on to explain why “none of the possible devolved powers is considered suitable for inclusion in the forthcoming 
legislation”. As a consolation prize, it added “the Government are prepared to discuss with the devolved administrations, if they 
so wish, whether it is possible to find acceptable supplementary tax powers”. The Government of the day wanted devolution of 
powers but not resources. Of course, no reform actually took place. Moreover, at about the same time, it was decided to lock 
in funding for Scotland by the application of the so-called Barnett Formula, which simply rolled forward Scotland’s then existing 
share of UK spending without regard to changing expenditure needs. Thus, Scotland and Wales came to be funded within a 
system without reference to variations in expenditure needs. This latter arrangement remains in place today. 
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the LayFieLd committee 1974 – 1976
6. To a backdrop of public discontent about domestic property tax rates, the Wilson 
government commissioned the Committee of Inquiry into Local Government Finance in 
1974 (the ‘Layfield Report’), as a comprehensive review of local government finance. 
7. The report situated the debate about local government finance in terms of local-central 
relations and set out two possible options for reform. The first was to give central 
government more control over local expenditure and greater responsibility for local 
matters, and the second, favoured by the majority of the Committee, was to give local 
authorities more control over expenditure with the balance of funding moving in favour of 
locally-raised revenues, in part through devolving taxation powers. 
8. Despite the report’s enduring influence on contemporary discourse about the subject, 
none of its recommendations were implemented. On the contrary, changes to local 
government finance in the years after Layfield have rendered local authorities more reliant 
on grant. 
LocaL GoveRNmeNt FiNaNce ReFoRm 1986-93
9. in 1986, the government published a green paper3 proposing the replacement of 
domestic rates by a community charge, commonly referred to as the poll tax. The 
document suggested its proposals were “the most radical reform of local government 
finance in Great Britain this century”, which proved to be an understatement. in 1990 
(1989 in Scotland), domestic rates were indeed replaced by the community charge, a flat-
rate tax paid by every adult, at a locally set rate. This tax proved fatally unpopular. The 
community charge was, in turn, replaced in 1993 by council tax. However, as part of the 
community charge reform, business rates had been transferred to central government 
control in 1990. Council tax, like the community charge, was the only tax under local 
government control and has remained so since. 
BaLaNce oF FuNdiNG Review 2003 – 2004
10. Following the introduction of council tax, concerns remained about the shortcomings of 
local government finance, and in particular the gearing effect of the council tax (where, 
for a 1 per cent increase in expenditure, council tax had to be increased by 4 per cent) 
and in 2003 the government appointed local government minister nick Raynsford mp (a 
member of the london finance commission) to undertake the Balance of funding Review, 
which considered the balance of local government funding sources and set out options 
for reform. Its remit did not include increasing local revenue, only rebalancing existing 
sources of funding. Its conclusions mainly set out areas for further investigation, including 
reform of council tax and business rates and the consideration of devolving existing taxes 
or introducing additional new revenues. Many of Raynsford’s proposals were subsequently 
considered by the successor Lyons Inquiry.
LyoNs iNquiRy 2004 – 2007
11. in 2004 the government commissioned sir michael lyons (who gave oral evidence to our 
Commission) to investigate ways to improve the form, function and funding of English 
local government. The Lyons Inquiry team published prolifically during its lifespan and 
identified many structural flaws in the local government finance system. The review 
argued that reform should render the system more flexible, offer clearer accountability 
and have built-in incentives. Lyons delivered pragmatic recommendations, some of which 
3 department of the environment, green paper ‘paying for local government’, cmnd 9714
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are set out below, based largely around improving the current system rather than radically 
reforming it. 
12. The Lyons Inquiry recommended that council tax should be retained as a source of local 
government revenue, but suggested various options for improvement including five-yearly 
revaluations and new property bands at the top and bottom of the current structure. In 
reflection of the unique characteristics of London’s property market, Lyons also argued 
that separate council tax bands should be considered for inner London. As a way to relieve 
pressure on council tax, the report recommended that greater discretion in relation to 
service charging should be extended to all local authorities.
13. Lyons did not propose that business rates should be re-localised, but advocated a power 
for local authorities to levy a local supplement in order to increase local flexibility and 
invest in infrastructure. in london this supplement should, it was argued, be collected at 
gla level in agreement with the boroughs and be hypothecated for purposes agreed in 
consultation with businesses. The report suggested that incentives for the efficient use of 
land could be provided through reforms to the empty property relief and by the possible 
taxation of derelict and previously developed land. Lyons also recommended that the 
government should consider introducing a tourist tax.
14. Other recommendations were intended to increase transparency and accountability, 
through providing better information on how nationally collected taxes are spent locally, 
and in the longer term through assigning part of the income tax to support local services. 
Accepting that equity and stability should remain the key objectives of the grant system, 
the report argued that it should incentivise growth ‘at the margins’. 
15. The legacy of Lyons’ comprehensive and pragmatic review of local government has been 
modest, though a number of his proposals have been implemented slowly at different 
stages since its publication. Lyons-initiated reforms have included the business rates 
supplement scheme4, increased business rates on empty properties (though these are 
determined at the national not the local level), greater flexibility on the amount of council 
tax local authorities can charge on empty properties and a limited introduction of TIF to 
incentivise local growth. 
City finanCe CoMMission 2011
16. the city finance commission, chaired by sir stuart lipton (a member of the london 
finance commission), was promoted by Birmingham, manchester and Westminster 
City Councils. It proposed ways to promote growth in UK cities, in the context of 
continuing recession.
17. Recommendations, centred around growth, included proposals for pooled budgets to 
deliver integrated local services, further financial and regulatory freedoms for cities, 
a business rate retention scheme and TIF powers. Many of its proposals have been 
implemented, at least in part. Business rate retention and TIF feature in the Local 
government finance act 2012, and the localism act 2011 created the opportunity for local 
authorities to make the case for being given new powers to promote economic growth and 
to set their own distinct policies, embodied in the brokering of several City Deals.
4 In practice, however, it is worth noting that only one business rate supplement levy has been implemented, in London, for 
Crossrail. We are not aware of any other attempts or plans to set supplementary levies elsewhere in the country.
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Mirrlees review 2011
18. The Mirrlees Review, conducted by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), is of partial 
relevance to local government finance, in that it describes how a modern tax system 
should look and makes recommendations for the reform and simplification of the UK 
system without arguing for devolution. 
19. Levelling strong criticism at inefficiencies in the housing tax system, it argued that council 
tax is regressive with respect to property values, that it gives an unfair discount for sole 
occupancy, and that the valuations that form its basis are out of date. Stamp duty is 
considered inefficient as a transactions tax because it discourages mobility and offers 
perverse incentives because of cliff-edge thresholds. The report states these taxes should 
be replaced with a simple tax similar to VAT on the consumption of housing, though 
none of its recommendations for fundamental change to the UK tax system have been 
implemented.
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paRt 1, chapteR 4 
principles adopted in making 
recommendations
1. Our recommendations aim to improve governance in London, and we consider the duty to 
promote growth an integral part of good governance. While economic development is not 
an inevitable consequence of constitutional change, the system operated by sub-national 
governments should be such that the tax-setting authority can use it to encourage 
economic growth. We believe that financial arrangements in place at present constrain 
economic growth, and our recommendations seek to redress such constraints. We found 
no compelling evidence that the devolution of financial powers would risk reducing 
economic growth or success.
2. We also believe there are powerful democratic arguments for plurality of power within 
a modern democracy. At present, virtually all taxation in the UK is determined by central 
government. Only council tax (and, in England from April 2013, a proportion of business 
rates) can be seen as local taxation and even this tax is subject to cumbersome controls 
including referendum procedures if local authorities are to change the tax rate upwards. A 
democratic system where the centre determines virtually 100 per cent of taxation surely 
fails by the standards of best practice in most OECD countries. We have approached our 
work mindful of this weakness in British democratic practice. 
table 1: taxation revenue attributable to sub-national and central/federal government as a 
percentage of Gdp, 2010
 local 
government
state/regional 
government
Local + state/
regional
Central 
government
social security total
canada 3.1 12.2 15.3 12.8 2.8 31.0
france 4.6 0 4.6 14.9 23.2 42.8
germany 2.8 7.6 10.4 11.3 14.0 36.0
italy 6.5 0 6.5 22.7 13.4 42.9
spain 3.0 5.8 8.8 11.2 11.9 32.2
sweden 16.1 0 16.1 23.7 5.5 45.5
United 
Kingdom
1.7 0 1.7 26.2 6.6 34.8
United 
states
3.9 5.0 9.1 9.2 6.3 24.8
oecd total 
(2010)
3.8 5.0 8.8 20.1 8.2 33.7
Source: OECD Stats Index
3. In the spirit of good governance, we have based our recommendations on an objective 
appraisal of evidence, both academic and that submitted by stakeholders, as appropriate. 
4. The London Finance Commission is independent of the Mayor and, while we have cross-
party political representation, our recommendations are not party-politically oriented 
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and, more importantly, are designed to encourage cross-party appeal as options to 
improve the way london government5 is funded.
5. We have adopted five principles to aid thinking and assess options systematically. We 
share most of the principles used by calman, holtham and silk, many of which can be 
applied generally to assess good governance and are not specific to London or sub-
national government. 
Principle 1: accountability
There should be a link between spending decisions and taxes raised. The impact of spending 
decisions by government should be clear to taxpayers and should be clearly linked to local 
well-being, for example in the promotion of local jobs and growth.
Principle 2: transparency
The financing system should be as simple as possible and it should not be so complex as to 
be incomprehensible. 
principle 3: efficiency and effectiveness
Decision-making by sub-national government should be such as to ensure the preferences 
of citizens are better met than if the same decisions were made by national government. 
the use of public money should avoid waste, in the sense that inputs should be minimised 
in relation to outputs and outcomes. Arrangements should minimise administration costs, 
economic distortions and tax avoidance. 
Principle 4: autonomy
Sub-national government should have choice about how much to spend and on what, such 
that it is not blocked from promoting local interests such as jobs and growth. A higher 
percentage of funding raised locally would be more likely to deliver autonomous sub-
national government than a lower one. The capacity to raise resources in this way is an 
important element in the constitutional balance between different spheres of government 
within a country.
Principle 5: fairness
the overall funding system should operate in a way that ensures all parts of a country or 
city receive acceptably fair service provision and face acceptably fair tax burdens. Matters 
of fairness are also relevant between individual taxpayers in different parts of a country or 
city, as well as matters of inter-generational equity. The assumption has been made that any 
proposed reform should not lead to a redistribution of resources to or from London at the 
point the reform occurred; that is, in the year change took effect London would neither be 
better nor worse off, a principle that also applies to individual boroughs. 
5 The term London government is used in a general sense in this report to mean the GLA and/or London Councils and/or London 
boroughs. please see part 5, chapter 2 for more detailed discussion of the topic. 
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2 evidence
In Part 2 we briefly summarise the evidence we 
received from stakeholders, and set out the findings 
of our academic literature review and the research we 
commissioned. 
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paRt 2, chapteR 1 
summary of evidence received 
1. We collected both written and oral evidence from a range of experts and interested 
parties. All evidence submissions are available on the London Finance Commission website 
here: www.london.gov.uk/london-finance-commission/evidence
2. Our call for written evidence was open from September to November 2012. We asked 
respondents to consider the current system for capital investment, to appraise local 
government finance arrangements and to propose improvements. It received a good 
response from a range of stakeholders6, including london boroughs, london councils, 
business organisations and the voluntary sector.
3. We hosted three oral evidence sessions from october to december 2012, allowing us to 
hear the differing views of a number of experts from a range of backgrounds and to enter 
into dialogue with them. the following witnesses addressed the commission:
• greg Clark (independent expert on city government)
• sir Merrick Cockell (Chair of the Local Government Association)  
 accompanied by paul Raynes
• John dickie (director of strategy and policy, london first)
• professor Jim Gallagher (secretary to the calman commission)
• Lord heseltine (former deputy prime minister, author of ‘no stone Unturned’)
• gerald holtham (chair of the independent commission on funding and  
 finance for Wales)
• paul Johnson (Director of the Institute for Fiscal Studies)
• ken livingstone (former mayor of london)
• sir Michael lyons (chairman of the Lyons Inquiry into Local Goverment)
oral evidenCe
4. Reflecting the diverse backgrounds of the witnesses, the nature and content of the 
evidence they presented differed, as did the opinions they expressed, in some cases greatly. 
For example Sir Michael Lyons was keen that further devolution should lead to more 
comprehensive stewardship of place, while Paul Johnson believed the case for national 
reform of a deeply flawed tax system should be prioritised before devolving any tax 
powers.
5. Witnesses agreed that arrangements in the UK are very centralised and acknowledged 
the fact that different models of government, some of which allow local government to 
operate in more fiscally independent ways (as highlighted by Greg Clark and Sir Merrick 
Cockell), function successfully in international cities. 
6. Jim Gallagher and Gerald Holtham discussed the underlying principles behind localised 
and centralised models; the former is more likely to be based on need, the latter on 
the principle of the origination, ie revenues raised in a certain area are also spent 
6 The City of London, the City of Westminster, the Core Cities Group, Greg Clark (cities expert), the Institute of Public Policy 
Research, the Local Government Association, the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the London Borough of Camden, 
the london Borough of ealing, the london Borough of islington, the london Borough of newham, the london Borough of 
Redbridge, the London Borough of Sutton, the London Borough of Waltham Forest, London Councils, London First, Manchester 
city council, the Royal Borough of Kingston Upon thames, transport for london and tomorrow’s people.
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there (as is the case with taxes raised in the UK being spent in the UK). Both systems 
have inherent advantages and disadvantages. however, the current system in the UK’s 
devolved administrations is somewhat more blurred, in that the Barnett Formula is not 
based on need per se, rather it is based on population size (and even that is inaccurate 
as calculations are 30 years out of date). Yet population size cannot be said to accurately 
relate to the origination of revenue either. 
7. Full consensus did not exist as to why the current system of governance is sub-optimal, 
how it should be improved, or whether the best route to improvement would be through 
devolving funding or powers or through other means, such as improving the national tax 
system. 
8. Witnesses also disagreed about the extent to which fiscal devolution can lead to growth. 
However, beyond arguments about the interpretation of academic research, Greg Clark 
referred to evidence presented by market sentiment surveys, which demonstrate market 
dissatisfaction with public sector infrastructure investment in London, for example in 
housing and airports. Although London has clear strengths that do attract business, its 
weak points could deter international investment, particularly from Asian markets. This 
problem seldom presents itself in UK discourse because infrastructure has been improving 
in London, but by international standards the progress made is insufficient. 
9. John Dickie explained that from a business perspective, the belief prevails that local 
authorities are not only insufficiently incentivised to promote growth, they are actually 
deterred from it. When granting planning permission for large developments, residents, 
who are also local voters, often oppose changes because they can cause disruptions and 
eventually increase service costs. moreover, the local authority in which a development is 
situated has traditionally received none of the financial benefits of local growth.
10. Greg Clark, John Dickie, Ken Livingstone and Sir Merrick Cockell emphasised London’s 
need for infrastructure, which will become increasingly acute as the population grows 
faster than in other parts of the country. This challenge is difficult to address because of 
uncertainty about future revenue flows. There is also an unhelpful tendency of bidding 
for ‘trophy projects’, which is often inefficient and/or leads to prominence being given 
to major developments over smaller ones. However, although the extent of the Mayor’s 
control over infrastructure projects is considered too limited, Paul Johnson acknowledged 
that central government’s agenda to restrict borrowing in the national interest was 
reasonable. He highlighted the merits of the prudential borrowing regime. 
11. A broad consensus existed amongst witnesses about the feasibility of further devolution 
or greater local autonomy. A number of practical suggestions were put forward. Lord 
Heseltine took the pragmatic view that ‘radical’ devolution is unlikely to take place in the UK 
context. He advocated an improved version of the development corporation model, with 
streamlined governance and finance arrangements, strong leadership and sufficient private 
sector representation, planning powers and resources. John Dickie stated that the business 
rate system should be improved because at present it is too complicated and uncertain. 
12. Regarding council tax, Sir Michael Lyons suggested that at the very least, revaluations 
should be conducted on a regular basis, Gerald Holtham considered it should be a local tax 
retained in London (based as it is on a London tax base), while Paul Johnson stated that the 
tax should be replaced completely by a more rational and progressive form of domestic 
property taxation. Sir Michael Lyons and Gerald Holtham stated that assignment of taxation 
is less preferable than full devolution, as it does not increase autonomy. Though witnesses 
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were cautious to recommend radical devolution because of the scope for distortions at 
London’s porous border, Jim Gallagher stated that if tax devolution were pursued, stamp 
duty would be a good candidate because of its immobile base. 
written evidenCe
13. The majority of respondents to our call for written evidence expressed support for 
the London Finance Commission and criticised current local government finance 
arrangements for being too centralised “largely through history not design” (london 
Borough of Ealing). The Local Government Association (LGA) stated that “the local tax 
system in this country is very centralised by international standards, and breaches the 
European Charter on Local Self-Government”. in general, respondents supported our 
principles of increasing accountability, autonomy and efficiency, transparent and fairness 
in local government finance. 
14. Respondents recognised london’s increasing need for infrastructure investment; the 
london Borough of Redbridge warning that “failure to invest in [infrastructure] will mean 
London’s offering is much less attractive for investors and thus a drawback to expansion 
plans.” The current system was generally regarded as inflexible, as it fails to allow local 
government to respond adequately to local circumstances and this inflexibility was 
considered to constrain growth. Greg Clark pointed out that London’s low level of fiscal 
autonomy means that it cannot “promote its own growth […] as effectively as it should. [Its 
limited tax raising ability] leads to a lower incentive structure for London governments to 
encourage business investment, and fewer tools to do it with.”
15. Business groups criticised the lack of engagement with the private sector that the current 
system engenders. this lack of engagement was seen to impede local growth because 
insufficient incentives are built into the system. As relatively little income is raised 
locally, councils are less likely to take seriously the concerns of businesses and are not 
compelled to incentivise growth. Indeed, London First stated that, “[the current situation] 
disincentivises London’s government from taking decisions that are economically positive 
(such as many relating to development) but may be politically unpopular.” Consequently 
business groups called for greater accountability towards businesses, with more effective 
business engagement as a pre-requisite for any reforms proposed.
16. The call made by business groups for greater growth incentives through greater 
accountability implied a need for local autonomy and an ability to respond to local 
circumstances. Respondents highlighted London-specific needs for capital investment, 
including for transport infrastructure, schools and housing. greg clark considered that 
at present, much infrastructure planning relies on “bidding and trophy projects”. ealing 
agreed that local authorities are not incentivised to use time and resources efficiently in 
the current system of bidding rounds for investment; bidding for any funds that happen 
to be available replaces evidenced cost-benefit analyses and “weakens the rigour which 
should be applied for the development of cases for investment in the capital”. 
17. A number of suggestions were made to encourage capital investment. At the heart of 
these proposals was the need for certainty; london first cited “volatile government grant” 
as one of the main problems blocking investment and planning, and criticised “the absurd 
situation in which the Mayor has to press central government to give him the resources to 
make vital investment in London’s infrastructure.” 
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18. The London Borough of Newham placed importance on local authorities being provided 
with additional capacity to borrow against their assets and rental income to deliver local 
priorities, echoing general enthusiasm for borrowing restrictions to be removed or relaxed. 
The LGA used the strong credit ratings of certain local authorities such as Kensington and 
chelsea to argue for greater freedom from central government to borrow, though tfl 
stated that it can borrow at favourable rates at present because of its perceived proximity 
to central government, an arrangement it would like to see sustained in order to retain its 
good credit rating. 
19. Greg Clark explained that borrowing powers are spread asymmetrically between London 
governance organisations. “Most of London’s financing power is at TfL and this probably 
means that London’s investment progress recently has been skewed more towards transport 
than in other areas such as housing, energy, waste and water.”
20. A number of London boroughs and London Councils criticised the design of the Housing 
Revenue Account (HRA). Ealing explained that “the HRA borrowing caps […] bear no 
relationship to the actual value of assets in London and act to limit access to private 
finance.” The London Borough of Sutton argued that “this is ‘good borrowing’, investing in 
local housing, in capital assets for the future and against a proven rent stream; this is not 
borrowing that is just offsetting a shortfall in annual tax revenues.” 
21. The principle of TIF was welcomed, but more schemes, with an extended reset timeframe 
of 25 years, were called for. the lga stated that: “to place an arbitrary limit on the number 
of TIF schemes means potentially missing out on the upside gains of developments […], this 
quota is a negligible amount compared to the potential TIF has to unlock new investment at 
no cost to the Exchequer.”
22. Overall, respondents specifically emphasised the need for a larger number of funding 
streams to be available to allow London government to finance infrastructure development 
successfully. This objective could be achieved through tax devolution or assignment.
23. An appetite for further fiscal freedoms was clear amongst respondents, though there is 
a spectrum of ambition. Sutton called for more powers and corresponding funding to be 
devolved to local authorities “not by total place or community budgets but by structural 
and legislative changes.” Yet there was also an acknowledgment that fiscal devolution is 
not a panacea; as expressed by the City of Westminster in reference to the way grants are 
allocated, “a more equitable allocation [of local government funding] could be achieved 
without the granting of any additional powers.” 
24. Greg Clark stated that if London had more control over tax revenues and investment 
tools it would be able to “capture the value of growth (taxes, land values, levies, charges) 
to support borrowing and investment and to recycle value to accelerate growth.” the 
greater manchester ‘earn Back’ scheme is based on a similar premise, taking the idea 
of incentivising growth beyond existing business rate schemes, and allowing additional 
revenues to be retained locally in relation to additional GVA created. Manchester City 
Council explained in its evidence that “if Greater Manchester is successful in driving 
economic growth, [it] will receive a larger proportion of resultant tax take generated from 
this growth than would otherwise be the case under business rate retention.” 
25. Frustration was apparent from local government respondents about council tax restrictions 
and the inadequacy of business rate reforms, both of which are considered too modest and 
too centralised. 
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26. The business rates system which has been in place since April 2013 is less devolutionary 
than the government’s original proposals and, in its current form, can be argued to be 
insufficient, over complex and too centralised. An increase in the locally retained share of 
business rates, some suggested up to 100 per cent, would be welcome, though opinion 
varied about where overall control over setting the business rate level should sit. Some 
evidence favoured central government, others local. 
27. A broader definition of growth in the business rate retention scheme was also called 
for, in order to encompass revaluation or ‘real-terms’ growth rather than just year-on-
year growth resulting from development on new sites. LCCI pointed out that “for many 
councils […] permitting new development may not be the main economic priority for the 
area and instead focus should be on delivering for existing business premises.” the london 
Borough of Camden suggested that local authorities should be able to benefit from 
revaluation gains resulting from public realm investments in ‘Local Action Zones’. 
28. Referenda on council tax rises, which are regarded as prohibitively expensive, and central 
government ‘council tax freeze grant’ represent an unwelcome move towards central 
control of a local tax source. As Camden put it, “central government does not have a 
referendum when it raises VAT or income tax and neither should local government face 
a referendum when it raises council tax”. The LGA stated that council tax should be 
‘uncapped and locally decided’. 
29. The City of Westminster called for relaxed central control over council tax, but accepted 
that if the referendum requirement is to stay in place “at the very least it should be 
expressed as an increase in absolute terms […] rather than a percentage increase”, 
because the effects of the current arrangements have the greatest impacts on local 
authorities with historically low council tax rates. 
30. In order to reflect local circumstances, Camden stated that the ceiling on council tax 
bands should be removed. the current system “solely benefits owners of multi-million 
pound properties of which the overwhelming majority are in London. Many of these 
properties are owned by foreign companies or non doms and their band H council tax 
(£2,657 p.a. in Camden) is minute in comparison to the value of a multi-million pound 
home.” 
31. Beyond modest improvements to council tax and business rates, a number of proposals 
were made for taxes including assigned property taxation and the introduction of new 
taxes. In order to avoid volatility, London Councils recommended that any tax devolution 
should be made up of a mixed portfolio of revenues. However, London First struck a note 
of caution that the businesses they represent may oppose devolution of taxes unless they 
experience tangible benefits as a result of any changes made.
32. Greater local discretion over fees and charges was recommended. London Councils 
stated that the result of centrally set fees “has always been perverse, militating against 
councils’ ability to work effectively with businesses and help drive growth and it also has 
other significant financial consequences for local taxpayers.” it therefore recommended 
that fees for planning applications, building control, land searches and licensing should be 
at the discretion of boroughs, which should be able to achieve full cost recovery and in 
some cases set market rates for these services. Westminster also called for the ability to 
offer price-differentiated levels of service in order to recoup costs and to offer innovative 
services, as well as the ability to extend the Night Time Levy in order to reflect particular 
local circumstances.
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33. Many respondents criticised the ‘siloed’ nature of central government grants and called 
for greater co-ordination between Whitehall departments. A number of London boroughs 
and the charity tomorrow’s people recommended a devolved budget for employment and 
skills programmes and recommended that there should be some local influence over the 
design of related programmes. london councils concluded that “the devolution of national 
services, currently delivered through Whitehall silos, is key to both better tailored and 
integrated local services.”
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7 Cheshire, P. and Magrini, S. (2009) ‘Urban growth drivers in a Europe of sticky people and implicit boundaries’
8 Cheshire, P. and Hilber, A. (2008) ‘Office space supply restrictions in Britain: the political economy of market revenge’
9 Centre for Cities (2011), ‘Room for Improvement: creating the financial incentives needed for local growth’
10 Morgan, K., ‘The English Question: Regional Perspectives on a Fractured Nation’, in Regional studies, VOL 36; PART 7, 2002, 797-
810 p798 and Morgan, K., ‘The Polycentric State: New Spaces of Empowerment and Engagement’ in Regional Studies. VOL 41; 
NUMBER 9, 2007, 1237-125 p1240
11 Ezcurra, R. and Rodriguez-Pose, A. (2010) ‘Is Fiscal Decentralization Harmful for Economic Growth? Evidence from the OECD 
countries’, p9
12 Ezcurra, R. and Rodriguez-Pose, A. (2010) ‘Is Fiscal Decentralization Harmful for Economic Growth? Evidence from the OECD 
Countries’, p24-25 
paRt 2, chapteR 2 
Academic and international 
evidence
1. Most academic authors point to the difficulties in measuring and comparing both the 
extent of fiscal devolution and its effects. With these inherent difficulties in mind, we 
have considered existing academic evidence available on the topic of fiscal devolution 
and where possible we have drawn general conclusions. We also commissioned our 
own research looking into the existing London arrangements in relation to comparable 
international cities in order to better understand the specifics of the situation.
existing aCadeMiC evidenCe
2. Broader academic evidence is inconclusive regarding the impact of devolution on 
economic growth or, indeed, on other possible effects. Studies variously show negative, 
positive and neutral relationships between devolution and growth, as outlined below.
3. A number of academics have explored the positive effects of devolution. Research by 
professor paul cheshire and colleagues7 demonstrates some positive effects on economic 
outcomes when economic development powers are held at the appropriate level and 
when local authorities are incentivised to create pro-growth planning regimes8. Research 
from the Centre for Cities9 demonstrating incentive effects, along with other research 
done by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) which had 
been endorsed by professor henry overman, formed the academic backbone of the 
government’s recent business rate reforms. 
4. Other positive effects include those discussed by Professor Kevin Morgan, who argues that 
devolved arrangements empower citizens and make governments more accountable10, 
and a paper by Professor Andres Rodriguez-Pose and colleagues, which suggests that 
general satisfaction with government can increase as a result of devolution, if the actual 
capacity of local government to deliver is augmented. Such findings bolster the idea that 
although devolution alone may not lead inevitably to economic development, allowing 
local leaders the autonomy to innovate and respond to local affairs may promote 
economic development. 
5. Yet other studies by Rodriguez-Pose and colleagues considering decentralisation in 
OECD countries show robust and significant negative relationships between economic 
development and decentralisation11. However, these authors state that the only exception 
to this trend occurs in areas with relatively low levels of fiscal decentralization; in such 
cases, moderate increases in fiscal decentralisation may have a positive impact on 
growth by allowing governments margin for manouvre12. overall they conclude that the 
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overall body of evidence about devolution is too contradictory to offer any meaningful 
conclusions13.
6. This diversity of findings is understandable given that measuring the degree of fiscal 
devolution in a region is very difficult and that outcomes for regions are influenced by 
many factors (such as existing regional disparities, regional policy and national economic 
performance) outside of fiscal devolution. We have therefore been cautious about using 
any single academic study to justify our recommendations, focusing instead on principles 
of good governance, including the premise that no compelling evidence should be 
disregarded.
7. However, we find the inconclusive nature of the body of evidence significant, in that 
it cannot be used to justify current arrangements either. In other words, no evidence 
conclusively shows that england’s highly centralised arrangements as they stand at present 
promote growth or are in any way objectively better than a localised solution. 
international CoMParisons
8. In order to better understand international models of city governance, we commissioned 
research from the University of toronto to describe and assess arrangements in 
comparable international cities (Paris, Berlin, Frankfurt, Madrid, Tokyo and New York) and 
to draw lessons from the wider literature on fiscal devolution to cities in the international 
context. Although the researchers encountered difficulties in making precise comparisons, 
the report we received gave us a useful insight into feasible solutions for metropolitan 
governance and placed London’s situation in context. The clear and important lessons 
which emerged are summarised below.
9. In terms of fiscal autonomy, London is an outlier compared to the cities studied. By 
comparison, it relies heavily on transfers from central government, with 73.9 per cent of 
its income received through grant, compared to 37 per cent in madrid, 30.9 per cent in 
New York, 25.5 per cent in Berlin, 17.5 per cent in Paris and only 7.7 per cent in Tokyo14. 
Moreover, London does not have comparable access to the diverse tax bases enjoyed in 
other cities:
 “The council tax in London does not meet all of the criteria for local fiscal autonomy 
because the GLA and boroughs do not determine the base of the tax and tax rate setting 
is restricted by national government. Non-domestic rates are not included as a local 
tax because these rates are a national tax in which the central government determines 
the tax base, sets the tax rate, collects the revenues, and distributes the funds to local 
government.” 15 
10. The Toronto paper makes a balanced appraisal of the benefits and disadvantages of fiscal 
autonomy using international examples, reflecting primary research and the body of 
academic evidence described above. the research suggests inconclusive outcomes, and 
includes the usual caveats that comparison is made difficult by many factors. It shows that 
tax competition can render a city more attractive to businesses and residents, particularly 
if revenues are used to improve local services. However, the report cites the cautionary 
examples of increases in local income tax levels in New York City and Philadelphia resulting 
in out-migration of business and significant estimated job losses. 
13 Ezcurra, R. and Rodriguez-Pose, A. (2010) ‘Is Fiscal Decentralization Harmful for Economic Growth? Evidence from the OECD 
countries’, p10
14 Slack, E. University of Toronto (2012), ‘International Comparison of Global City Financing’, p12
15 Slack, E. University of Toronto (2012), ‘International Comparison of Global City Financing’, p13
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11. Yet although the paper highlights problems associated with some forms of fiscal 
autonomy, overall the report concludes that London would benefit from greater fiscal 
autonomy through a portfolio of devolved taxes:
“A mix of taxes would give London more flexibility to respond to local conditions such 
as changes in the economy, evolving demographics and expenditure needs, changes in 
the political climate, and other factors […] Local fiscal autonomy and, in particular the 
ability to set tax rates, is also important for accountability: governments that raise their 
own revenues and set their own taxes to meet local expenditure needs tend to be more 
responsible and more accountable to taxpayers.” 16
12. We also received written evidence detailing arrangements in a number of international 
cities, including New York, Tokyo, Paris, Hong Kong and Singapore, from a highly respected 
independent advisor on global cities, Greg Clark, who observed lessons for London both as 
a capital and as a global city. 
13. He identified two main challenges facing London, which in his view cannot be overcome 
without greater fiscal and financial autonomy. First it needs to have the ability to better 
integrate different approaches, reconciling different infrastructure and utilities regimes 
in ‘smart’ ways. Greater control over investment would also allow it to anticipate growth 
better and to invest to manage growth more effectively. It would allow the city to capture 
the value of growth (taxes, land values, levies and charges) to support borrowing and 
investment and to recycle value to accelerate growth further. it may also allow it to set 
taxes in such a way as to incentivise enterprise and private investment. Second, London 
needs to act as a supportive capital city, providing opportunities and resources for the 
growth of other cities in the UK without having to compete with them for public funds.  
16 Slack, E. University of Toronto (2012), ‘International Comparison of Global City Financing’, p25 - 26
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3 Supporting London and  UK growth
Part 3 of the report considers London’s infrastructure 
needs; with an economy larger than Sweden’s, 
London has become one of the world’s pre-eminent 
city economies, and the strong demographic and 
economic growth it has seen in recent years is forecast 
to continue. In this part of the report we argue that 
it would be detrimental for London and the UK if the 
capital’s growth were to be hampered by a failure to 
invest. We demonstrate that the current model for 
providing capital investment is likely to be insufficient 
both for London’s needs and its economic growth 
potential. We argue that the Mayor and the boroughs 
working in partnership with business and others 
should have much greater independence to provide 
infrastructure and to incentivise growth, and we 
recommend that a range of borrowing constraints 
on productive investments should be removed. Our 
argument that cities are engines of economic growth, 
and that civic leaders are the best custodians of their 
future, applies to the UK’s other major cities just as 
well as to London. 
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paRt 3, chapteR 1 
London and UK Cities
introduCtion
1. Our overarching recommendation is that funding arrangements in London should 
allow London government to make additional self-determined investments in its 
own infrastructure both to cater for the growth already forecast for its population 
and economy, and to promote additional economic growth. Relaxing restrictions on 
borrowing for capital investment while retaining prudential rules and simultaneously 
devolving the full suite of property tax revenue streams will afford London government 
greater autonomy to invest in the capital. such reforms would also increase london 
government’s accountability to residents and businesses. such change would be 
achieved in such a way as to avoid affecting the financial settlements of other parts of 
the country. 
2. indeed, london’s growth is important for the economic health of the whole country, 
and it is therefore vital that it is not impeded by a failure to meet its demand for 
infrastructure. As London’s population and economy grows, substantial investment 
in it’s infrastructure will be required. In this chapter we briefly set out its projected 
infrastructure needs and explain the shortcomings of current funding methods. We 
propose as a starting point a high-level assessment of London’s growing needs, matched 
to potential sources of funding in a way that does not burden the UK Exchequer.
Cities as drivers of growth
3. Cities are the economic motors of the country. In the UK, they cover just 9 per cent 
of its landmass but contain 54 per cent of the population and generate 60 per cent 
of its GVA with 53 per cent of all businesses and 72 per cent of all highly skilled 
workers17. Sustaining cities requires a combination of investments to meet their 
social needs, help grow their economies and make them better places to live and 
work. We consider that civic leaders, working with local stakeholders, are much 
better positioned to get this right than Whitehall officials and ministers working in a 
number of separate and insufficiently coordinated departments. Better governance 
would be possible through deciding locally about priorities and helping to integrate 
investments. In the UK, cities need greater freedoms and tools to do this work; we 
consider these prerequisites for stronger economic growth. 
london and the rest of the uk 
4. the recent performance of london’s economy is a success story. however, its economic 
prosperity has not always been considered a priority. managed decline of the UK capital 
was the overarching post-war policy until the early 1980s and it has only been since the 
renaissance of london from the early 1990s to the present day that the UK has once 
again been home to one of the world’s premier cities. London is one of the greatest 
business centres in the global economy and one of the strongest performing regions in 
the UK. ons data shows that between 2007 and 2011:
17 Centre for Cities website, ‘City by City’, http://www.centreforcities.org/cities/
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“London’s nominal output has risen faster than other regions; its employment and 
unemployment rates have fared better than other regions; it has seen a larger growth in 
its active business stock; it has seen an increase of over 250,000 jobs whilst most other 
regions have seen a decline; and the average incomes of its residents have increased 
when compared to residents elsewhere in the UK... From 2007 to 2011 London’s economy 
(GVA) grew by a nominal 12.4% compared to between 2.3% and 6.8% across other UK 
regions...” 18
5. it is clearly not ideal for the overall performance and balance of the UK economy and 
the rest of the country to be so reliant on the capital, and also for there to be a growing 
disparity between the capital’s economy and that of the rest of the UK. Interventions 
to support growth in the rest of the UK are therefore to be welcomed. We support the 
efforts of the Core Cities19 to exploit the economic potential of England’s regional cities 
and gratefully received their support for the London Finance Commission in their written 
evidence submission. We agree with their statement there that:
“We all need London to continue to succeed, but it is unhelpful and incorrect to see 
growth elsewhere in the country simply as displacement from the South East. This severely 
limiting concept stymies the national ability to recover and grow.”
6. no one would sensibly argue that london should be less able to invest in itself than at 
present or receive less investment than it needs. It is difficult to envisage a scenario in 
which london’s economic decline would be favourable for the rest of the UK and we 
reject the notion which is occasionally articulated that London should be constrained 
in order to ‘balance’ UK economic growth. In most markets, London is competing as 
much, if not more so, internationally than against other UK cities20. many foreign direct 
investment projects that London wins in competition with other international cities 
provide benefits for other regions21, and many tourists who visit london go on to other 
parts of the UK22. Other international cities vie for investment, visitors, students and 
talent, and in the global competition, London risks falling behind and, in respect of 
infrastructure, further behind. 
7. however, we argue that the freedoms the capital should enjoy should also apply to 
other cities, which are drivers of growth in the rest of the UK. As Greg Clark stated in his 
evidence to the commission: 
“London needs to be an effective and generous capital city for the UK, supporting other 
cities, regions, and nations within the country, and providing opportunities and resources 
for their development, whilst not competing with them for public funds and transfers.”
18 ONS, ‘London’s economy has outperformed other regions since 2007’ (http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171780_302543.pdf)
19 The Core Cities represents the following major English cities: Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, 
Nottingham and Sheffield.
20 The Mayor’s promotional agency, London and Partners, has an explicit remit to attract international (and only international) FDI 
projects, students and tourists. it does not promote london for an increasing share of the UK market. 
21 a survey by think london found that “more than half (55%) of the companies (surveyed) said they had used london as a 
“springboard” for expansion into other parts of the UK and Europe.” Source: Think London, ’52 Billion: the Value of Foreign Direct 
Investment to London’, p7, http://d2mns3z2df8ldk.cloudfront.net/l-and-p/assets/media/london_focus_52billion.pdf 
22 The capital is one of the most visited cities in terms of international visitor numbers, comparable to some Far Eastern cities such 
as Singapore and Hong Kong, outperforming other European cities such as Paris. Total annual visitor numbers to London were 
greater than 15 million in 2011 (around half of the UK total) and visitor spend increased by 7.7 per cent to over £9.4 billion (over 
half of the UK total) with london receiving around 91 and a half million visitor nights with the rest of the UK regions receiving just 
over 143 and half million visitor nights.
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london’s growth
8. London’s population grew from 6.7 million to 8.4 million between 1986 and 2013. It 
is projected to surpass its previous peak (8.6 million in 1939) as early as 2016, and to 
reach 9 million by 2020 and nearly 10 million in 2030. this rise will be driven by london’s 
natural growth rate, itself driven by London’s relatively youthful population23. 
9. Accommodating London’s growth in ways that are benign for society and good 
for the economy will present many challenges. Financing the investment required 
will be a major challenge, whether as a direct consequence of population growth 
(housing, schools, primary healthcare and so on), to assist sustained economic growth 
(for example through transport, skills, higher education, innovation, research and 
development, ICT, electricity supply and the green economy) or to benefit society 
more broadly (through investments in the public realm, culture, crime prevention and 
so on). In practice, many investments will meet more than one of these objectives 
simultaneously. 
10. Based on historic trends, london’s employment is likely to reach almost 5.8 million 
jobs by 2036, an increase of 860,000 from 2011. Jobs are highly concentrated, with 34 
per cent of london’s employment located in just two per cent of its land mass. gla 
projections show that jobs could grow by some 280,000 between 2011 and 2036 within 
the Central Activities Zone, creating the additional agglomeration benefits associated 
with dense clusters of employment. 
11. Such agglomeration benefits support the development of economic activity by providing 
firms with access to a deep and highly skilled labour force, a range of complementary 
input and output markets and the benefits of spillover effects such as the rapid transfer 
of innovation and knowledge. It is just such agglomeration benefits which mean that 
many specialist economic activities take place solely in London, for example in the 
creative and high-tech industries. Maintaining and enhancing these agglomeration 
benefits will require increased spending on infrastructure such as transport, electricity 
supply and internet access into the future, enabling London’s increasing population the 
opportunity to access london’s jobs and simultaneously giving london’s businesses 
access to a large pool of well qualified labour.
infrastruCture needs in a growing City
12. Clearly, cities and the economic clusters they accommodate rely on a combination 
of infrastructure investments, which are not independent of one another. if london 
government had the autonomy to invest in its own priorities, it is likely it would be able 
to assess and deliver the correct balance. 
transport
13. For transport, London’s overall growth is expected to mean that the additional public 
transport capacity created by Crossrail, Tube and national rail upgrades will be fully 
utilised by the early 2020s, so more capacity will be needed. London’s overall growth is 
projected to translate into a rise of 30 per cent in passenger numbers on the tube and 
rail between 2011/12 and 202024. the pressures on london’s roads are also growing 
and there is a need for a major investment programme to improve the reliability of the 
23 Rounded, London’s average annual natural growth (births minus deaths) is expected to be 87,000 (2012-2021) and 84,000 (2022 – 
2030); average annual net migration, by contrast, is forecast to be 2,000 and -27,000 respectively over the same periods.  
Source: London Data Store (http://data.london.gov.uk/datastore/package/gla-demographic-projections).
24 TfL, ‘The Mayor’s Rail Vision for London - Investing in Rail Services in London’, p7 (http://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/
mayors-rail-vision-2012-final.pdf)
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road network and tackle congestion. Investment will also encourage walking and cycling, 
improve air quality and deliver a better public realm. 
14. In its written evidence London Councils cited not just the need for greater investment, but 
also the need for more commissioning capacity across the capital. In particular London 
Councils suggested that powers be devolved to boroughs to initiate and act as a client 
for local infrastructure and to increase the commissioning capacity to meet the demands 
of new investment. This relates to transport in particular. London Councils believes that 
the capital cannot develop at the pace it needs to meet present demand plus the future 
requirements of over a million new residents unless more responsibility is devolved. 
london’s boroughs need to be given greater power to help develop the shared vision for 
infrastructure and growth, particularly in relation to transport. 
housing
15. For housing, three key considerations must be addressed as part of an effective policy. 
First the supply of homes must be adequate to meet current and projected future 
needs. second the pricing and tenure of the housing stock must ensure that homes are 
accessible and affordable to the full range of needs that must be met. Third the size, 
condition and energy efficiency of homes must be appropriate to meet these needs 
without creating unreasonable problems of overcrowding, squalor or fuel poverty. New 
housing must also contribute to meeting carbon reduction commitments. Each of these 
requirements overlaps to some extent with the others. For example, as can be seen from 
current experience in London, a shortage of supply exerts upwards pressure on rent 
levels particularly in the private-rented sector, which in turn has impacts on access and 
affordability. These requirements also raise interesting questions of definition. In our view 
it is clear that housing need has long since exceeded supply. The emphasis on supply being 
sufficient to meet needs rather than demand is deliberate and necessary in a city which 
has seen a rapid growth in population over the past 20 years (caused both by natural 
expansion and immigration). London is a magnet to incomers from all over the UK and 
worldwide. Many of these incomers bring skills and entrepreneurial aptitudes that will 
contribute very substantially to London’s future economic success, but the capacity of the 
capital city to accommodate potential demand is limited.
16. Over the past decade, London’s population has grown to 8.4 million people, but housing 
supply has failed to keep pace with this growth. london needs to build about 40,000 new 
homes a year, which is double the number that has been built over the last two decades. 
this mismatch between supply and need results in rising homelessness in the capital, 
a high proportion of households in temporary accommodation, the highest levels of 
overcrowding and the greatest disparity between average incomes and house prices. the 
cost of buying a home has risen to an average of £392,000, 60 per cent higher than in the 
rest of the UK, and home ownership in the capital has fallen below 50 per cent for the 
first time in generations. With buyers unable to access mortgages, more and more young 
people are in the private-rented sector, which now houses a quarter of all Londoners, 
double the proportion of 20 years ago and the only growing housing tenure. These tenants 
are paying more than ever, with rents having risen by one third since 2009. more than 
360,000 households are on borough waiting lists and over 38,000 are housed in temporary 
accommodation. Even with optimistic assumptions about new house building in London 
it is estimated that the current housing shortage will have increased by around 249,000 
homes by 202025.
25 London Councils, ‘Meeting Londoners’ housing needs: investing in housing infrastructure’ p2 
(http://www.londoncouncils.gov.uk/policylobbying/housing/supply/MeetingLondonershousingneeds.htm)
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17. As well as helping to house London’s increasing population, building new homes makes 
a significant contribution to job creation and stimulates economic growth. Housing 
helps the economy in two ways. First, through construction and subsequent furnishing 
it creates jobs and supports a wide range of suppliers in both london and the rest of the 
UK. Second, through the mix of housing provided, it can ensure a balance of supply to 
support the range of workforce that is essential to the economic and social wellbeing of 
the capital. London is distinguished from many other international cities by successfully 
housing a diverse range of people, with widely different incomes, all across the city. 
if there are not enough homes to accommodate the projected increase in london’s 
professional and technical sector, london’s economy could lose out. analysis suggests 
that the greatest deficit in supply is in the mid and lower mainstream markets, homes 
at prices people working in newly created jobs can afford26. over seventy per cent of 
London’s businesses say that the lack of housing that is affordable is one of the most 
important constraints on london’s economy27. The Confederation of British Industry 
has, for the first time, cited housing as a bigger barrier to growth in the capital than 
transport28. Failing to invest in London’s housing will run the danger of choking off 
london’s economic growth, and with it the growth of the UK.
schools
18. In relation to schools, research by the National Audit Office shows29 there will also 
be continued and substantial demand for investment, as London’s school population 
increases from just under 1.1 million pupils in the system in 2011/12 to approximately 
1.25 million by 2016/17. London Councils estimates that, based on current projections, 
london boroughs are facing a shortage of 118,000 primary and secondary school places 
up until 2016/17. The pressure on school places is at its most acute in London, where 42 
per cent of all shortages in school places nationally will be found (although other areas 
also face shortages), yet london will only receive 36 per cent of the recent basic need 
capital allocation for 2013 to 201530. the pressure that is currently felt most in primary 
schools will inevitably extend to secondary schools over time, with the result that both 
primary and secondary schools need to be expanded and new schools built to respond 
to growing demands.
other infrastructure
19. amongst others, investment in healthcare, energy, waste, and water supply 
infrastructure will also be needed. It is estimated that by 2015 demand for water will 
outstrip supply by over 20 million litres per day. In its written evidence submission, 
the city of london raised housing, schools, transport and sewerage as infrastructure 
priorities but also stated that:
“London needs to be forward looking in embracing [infrastructure for] new technology 
sectors and innovation, in particular in areas that would help to address pollution and 
energy concerns, for example sustainability and energy efficiency.”
26 savills, ‘spotlight on london’s housing supply’, 2012, p3
27 LSE, ‘The case for investing in London’s affordable housing’, 2011, p3
28 cBi, ‘london Business survey’, 2012, p14.
29 The NAO research concludes that “there are indications of real strain on school places”. The number of infant classes with more 
than 31 children has doubled since 2007; that 240,000 of the new places required by 2014/15 are primary school places, of which 
37 per cent are in London. Source: National Audit Office ‘Capital funding for new school places’. See Figure 5, p20
30 london councils, ‘do the maths: tackling the shortage of schools places in london’, p3
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funding for investMent 
20. The different sectors in which capital investment will be required have a variety of 
governance and funding mechanisms, but broadly can be divided into the regulated 
utilities, the private sector and the public sector31. 
21. The regulated utilities, water, gas, electricity, and telecommunications, are all able to 
borrow relatively cheaply on capital markets and repay borrowings from user charges. 
These markets do not always provide sufficient goods and services to meet demand, 
but at least the model of having a regulated asset base enables borrowing against 
clearly identified future revenue streams. Furthermore, because the regulatory system 
guarantees a return on efficient investment, regulated utilities are able to finance their 
activities at a relatively small margin above the cost of government borrowing.
22. the private sector model of investment (to make returns for those providing capital) is 
also straightforward, although in some instances suffers from market failures, including 
public goods that the private sector cannot provide, and social inequities that require state 
intervention. 
23. Public sector sources of investment are less straightforward and have in the past 
comprised a mixture of central government grants, Public Works Loans Board (PWLB) 
borrowing, the private finance initiative (PFI), and individually negotiated funding packages 
for specific projects. Investment sources are very heavily departmental in nature; new 
schools, hospitals, homes and major transport schemes are all nationally funded by 
separate central government departments through ring-fenced grants. This fragmentation 
makes co-ordination of investment decisions across sectors difficult, which can increase 
inefficiency and reduce effectiveness. Furthermore, while public sector bodies have the 
lowest cost of finance, additional investment leads to pressures on the overall public 
finances, tending to discourage sufficient investment. At present, there are examples of 
joined-up investments at the local level, though this is generally because of local ingenuity 
rather than central government consistency. This no more than ‘satisfactory’ outcome, 
however, has derived from the delivery of schemes conceived and funded in rosier times 
for the UK’s public finances. 
24. Ensuring the prioritisation of long-term investment can be difficult within a political 
process that is often more short-term in perspective. Successive governments have 
favoured consumption over investment, a problem that has been exaggerated by 
increasing pressures on revenue budgets in recent years; as the effects of cutting capital 
expenditure are not immediately visible, capital budgets can be more vulnerable than 
others. Although we welcome the Government’s explicit decision to increase capital 
investment32, we note still that overall capital investment has declined33. While investment 
in transport has improved in recent years (though remains sub-optimal, please see 
the case study of crossrail below), pressures on the system will intensify in line with 
population and economic growth. As discussed above, investment in many kinds of 
infrastructure has been insufficient.
31 See Figure 2 on p24 of the London First Infrastructure Commission report (http://londonfirst.co.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2012/09/London_First_Infrastructure_Commission_report_-_EMBARGOED.pdf)
32 With the march 2013 Budget announcing that the government will “increase capital spending plans by £3 billion a year from 
2015-16, to lock in recent increases in capital spending over the Spending Review 2010 period, funded through reductions in 
current spending.” Source: Budget 2013, Executive Summary, p4, (http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/budget2013_executive_
summary.pdf)
33 Public Sector Net Investment expressed in 2011/12 prices declined from £51.2 billion in 2009/10 to £28.7 billion in 2011/12.
Source: Public finances databank March 2013. 
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Figure 1: Government capital investment over time
Source: Office for National Statistics (Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses, 2012)34
25. Furthermore, funding bigger and one-off capital projects has rarely been considered 
effective or satisfactory. Putting together the funding for Crossrail was a difficult and 
protracted process, and other transport schemes are still experiencing difficulties, 
although the mayor has recently devoted a £300m fund from tfl’s overall budget to assist 
transport schemes that are necessary for housing and business growth. other major 
schemes, though, such as Crossrail 2, will still require equally innovative funding methods.
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Crossrail: a case study
A version of Crossrail was first put forward in the 1940s and proposed formally in 1974 
following a joint Government and Greater London Council inquiry. However, after many 
years of development, a Government backed private bill fell at the Committee stage in 
1994, ostensibly on the grounds that an insufficiently strong business case had been made. 
Crossrail was revived in the early 2000s and both Mayors Livingstone and Johnson led 
sustained lobbying campaigns over the following years. Numerous reports were written and 
inquiries held and the Government only finally decided to fund Crossrail in October 200735.
The green light was given two years after the Crossrail Bill had started its long passage 
through parliament. purportedly it had the longest run of any Bill in parliamentary history, 
from 2005 – 2008. The Business Rates Supplement Act 2010 enabled a core part of Crossrail’s 
funding, empowering the Mayor to establish a special hypothecated tax, the business 
rate supplement36. a further campaign was led by the current mayor in 2010 in order to 
reconfirm the decision of the previous Government. Thirty-five years after it was formally 
proposed, Crossrail’s construction finally began in 2009, but services are not due to start 
until 2018, nearly 80 years after the scheme was first suggested.
It is almost certain that such projects would be delivered more quickly were there to be 
greater local autonomy both to decide and finance them. It is hard to imagine the process 
being any slower37. 
ConClusion 
26. in our view, london government would consider investment in infrastructure more of a 
priority than central government does, for reasons of accountability; the electorate in 
London has a more acute appreciation of infrastructure because of its centrality to their 
lives and London politicians are therefore more likely to address infrastructural problems. 
27. Data on the investment needs for the city are still contained in a number of different 
documents, and no comprehensive assessment exists, which partly reflects the variety 
of organisations and investment regimes described above. The GLA’s London Plan 
Implementation Plan attempts to bring together many of the different regimes that 
operate in London. However, a more comprehensive funding and financing plan is needed, 
with requirements for key stakeholders to pay regard to the capital’s needs and report 
progress. london government should take greater responsibility for infrastructure in the 
capital, potentially through commissioning powers being delegated to borough level.
35 Depending on various assumptions, the range for Crossrail’s transport benefits (net of costs) has most recently estimated to be 
between £5-10 billion with wider economic benefits between £4-8 billion. Its benefit cost ratio is appraised at between 2-3:1 (see 
the department for transport’s ‘crossrail business case update: summary report 2011’). this strong business case has not altered 
significantly since work done from the early part of the last decade. 
36 in 2010, the mayor of london used the power granted under the Business Rate supplement act to establish a 2p in the pound 
business rate supplement for crossrail for premises over £55,000 in rateable value. this supplement is projected to provide £4.1 
billion, or over one third, of Crossrail’s total funding requirement of £12.3 billion (TfL 2013/14 Business Plan). 
37 although beyond our remit as a commission, we consider that the wider system for delivery of large infrastructure projects may 
also require reform.
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reCoMMendations 
R1: our overarching recommendation is that funding arrangements in London should 
allow London government to make additional self-determined investments in its 
own infrastructure both to cater for the growth already forecast for its population 
and economy, and to promote additional economic growth. Relaxing restrictions on 
borrowing for capital investment while retaining prudential rules and simultaneously 
devolving the full suite of property tax revenue streams will afford London government 
greater autonomy to invest in the capital. such reforms would also increase London 
government’s accountability to residents and businesses. change would be achieved 
without affecting the financial settlements of other parts of the country.
R2: we recommend that the Government should require the mayor, working with London 
councils, the boroughs and the London enterprise panel, to develop and maintain a 
long-term, high level capital investment plan for the city. this should set out the costs 
of strategic investment options and match them to the resources available both now 
and in a more devolved future. the mayor should be required to report progress against 
this plan to increase accountability. this exercise would help bring out gaps in available 
funding, and, indirectly, help to clarify further roles and responsibilities. such work 
should be done with the support and involvement of infrastructure uK at the national 
level and the boroughs at the local level, including the information prepared for 
community infrastructure Levies. 
R3: the Government should require the utility regulators to have regard to the London plan 
and the high level investment plan recommended here, in consultation with businesses. 
r4: we further propose that the Mayor of london should have a wider responsibility as a 
champion of all infrastructure planning for the capital, but should also look wherever 
possible to delegate powers to london’s boroughs to act as commissioners of local 
infrastructure projects thereby increasing the overall infrastructure capacity across 
the capital.
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paRt 3, chapteR 2 
Funding and incentivising growth
38 DCLG, ‘Business rates retention scheme: The economic benefits of local business rates retention’, p4, (https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/11472/2146726.pdf)
1. in order to provide the infrastructure necessary for london’s growth, it is clear that 
London government as a whole must have greater access to finance to enable it to invest 
for the growing city, as well as ways to incentivise additional growth in ways that can fund 
further projects. In this chapter, we discuss the delivery and financing mechanisms that 
could be applied to the identified investment priorities. 
fisCal devolution
2. Fiscal devolution should act as a powerful incentive to promote, sustain, accommodate 
and speed up london’s projected rate of growth. the government’s own independent 
appraisal of the 2013 business rate reforms indicates that, on average, there would be 
a beneficial GDP impact across England of between £2 billion and £20 billion over seven 
years38. Such an increase in GDP is significant given the limited nature of the incentives 
introduced. Following the logic of business rate retention, if even greater fiscal authority 
were devolved to London, the city’s government would be given a still more powerful 
incentive to develop the economy.
3. Such fiscal devolution would enable London government to borrow more within its own 
prudential borrowing framework and thus to deliver additional and more appropriate 
projects. It would also allow London to set more of its own priorities, with due regard 
to central government policy and best practice, but without slavishly bidding for central 
government funds. With even a limited form of fiscal devolution, there would be greater 
ability to allocate resource funding to capital investments both directly and by building 
up reserves. 
‘earn BaCk’
4. Though the logic of the April 2013 business rate reform represents a starting point, there 
is clearly scope for london to retain more of the resources it raises in order to usefully 
reinvest them, building on the initiative of the Manchester ‘Earn Back’ scheme.
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greater Manchester ‘earn Back’
greater manchester received agreement in principle for its ‘earn Back’ model as part of its 
City Deal in 2012. It uses a formula, linked to changes in rateable values over time at the 
greater manchester level, to provide a revenue stream to greater manchester over  
30 years if additional GVA is created relative to a baseline. It provides an additional incentive 
for Greater Manchester to prioritise local government spending to maximise GVA growth. If 
successful in driving economic growth, Greater Manchester will receive a larger proportion 
of resultant tax take generated from this growth than would otherwise be the case under 
business rate retention. 
The ‘earned back’ resources are the to be used for further investment, similarly prioritised on 
net GVA impact at Greater Manchester level. This will create a revolving fund which rewards 
Greater Manchester for delivering growth. Investment will be funded up-front by Greater 
manchester, and government will only surrender revenues once greater manchester’s 
investment has generated value above an agreed baseline from 2015-16.  
The model is expected to have a substantial impact on Greater Manchester. The locally 
funded element of the programme will deliver a short-term boost to demand in excess of 
£2bn by 2016 and in the longer term the forecast economic impact of the local contributions 
exceeds £1bn per annum by 2025. At least 25 per cent of the impact comes through 
productivity gains and given that these benefits are net at the Greater Manchester level, 
a significant proportion of the remainder will also be net at the national level. In addition, 
operating at Greater Manchester level will eliminate displacement from elsewhere in the city. 
5. following the logic of the greater manchester agreement, it should be possible to develop 
a pan-London (and/or a series of sub-London proposals) such that, if agreed employment 
forecasts were exceeded, London would benefit from a proportion of the resulting 
additional tax revenue and foregone public sector costs such as welfare payments. The 
ability to make such agreements would create the opportunity and incentive for London 
government to develop policies, programmes and projects intended to produce a higher 
level of tax and lower public spending than would otherwise have been the case. Both 
London and national government would benefit from this increased revenue and reduce 
expenditure. Clearly, there could also be risks with such an approach if targets were not 
met, for example the London economy might underperform as compared to the UK as 
a whole or the devolved tax base might shrink for some reason. But, notwithstanding 
such risks, we consider that the Government and London should explore more radical 
approaches to building incentives for London government into the tax system, similar 
to those proposed for greater manchester. at the very least, the logic of greater 
Manchester’s ‘Earn Back’ scheme provides a framework to consider more radical tax 
retention policies for London and other cities or city regions.
tax inCreMent finanCing
6. another model that can be used to unlock growth is tif. this mechanism is well 
established in the United States for promoting growth in regeneration areas. It has 
recently been endorsed by the government in the UK, although its use is heavily 
regulated. there is a limit on borrowing against future business rate yield outside the 
new local government finance system of levies and resets (so-called ‘TIF 2’, which has 
now been re-styled as New Development Deals), and central government is placing a 
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nationwide limit of £150m over a three-year period, which is funded through a top-slice 
from the national pot of local government formula-based grant funding.
7. The principle of TIF is central to our vision for London, as the capital has clear potential for 
growth if it can finance the infrastructure it requires. The Government’s support for the 
Northern Line Extension to Battersea, which will be funded by additional business rates as 
well as developer contributions, is a welcome endorsement of the TIF principle in practice. 
however, the evidence we received is strongly in favour of removing centrally imposed 
constraints on TIF; for example, the LGA stated in its evidence to us:
‘Tax increment financing offers considerable scope for generating growth that would not 
otherwise happen by expediting development where the main obstacle is the high upfront 
cost of enabling infrastructure.’
8. In our view, the Mayor and London’s local authorities should determine which TIF 
projects to proceed with, within the prudential borrowing code. The potential for locally 
led TIFs would be increased through the devolved fiscal measures we propose in Part 
4. Meanwhile, the Government should start with a presumption in favour of funding all 
TIF projects that can demonstrate net gains to the public finances as a whole (through, 
at the national and/or local level, increasing the tax yield or reducing public expenditure 
or both) after adjusting for risk. The high level of regulation in the UK has been justified 
in part because of practice in the United States, where some implausible projects have 
been endorsed. However, the situation in the US is very different; the TIF market there is 
far more mature, initial schemes having started in the 1950s and thousands more having 
been given the go ahead since the rapid expansion of the policy instrument in the 1970s, 
whereas in the UK it is not even in its infancy. There should still be a role for central 
government to oversee the overall portfolio of such projects and assess any systemic 
problems, but by far the biggest problem at present is the dearth of tif projects that are 
currently underway. 
iMPaCt on Borrowing 
9. The Prudential Code is a well-developed framework for capital investment which has 
operated successfully for a decade and which applies to the GLA, TfL and local authorities. 
As the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) has stated in 
correspondence with the commission:
“the Prudential Code provides a framework to ensure that borrowing of local 
authorities for capital investment is affordable, deliverable and in line with local 
authorities’ service plans.” 
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the prudential code
The Prudential Code was developed by CIPFA as a professional code of practice to support 
local authorities in taking their decisions. The objectives of the Prudential Code are to 
ensure, within a clear framework, that the capital investment plans of local authorities are 
affordable, prudent and sustainable, and that Treasury management decisions are taken in 
accordance with good professional practice. 
Local authorities need to demonstrate that their capital investment plans are affordable, 
prudential and sustainable. This performance is reported in a range of prudential financial 
indicators. The Prudential Code sets out the indicators to be used and the factors to be 
taken into account in making treasury management decisions. Authorities need to give 
consideration to the following when setting or revising prudential indicators: 
• service objectives, eg strategic planning for the authority
• stewardship of assets, eg asset management planning
• value for money, eg option appraisal
• prudence and sustainability, eg implications for external debt and whole life costing
• affordability, eg implications for council tax
• practicality, eg achievability of the forward plan.
In order to carry out their duties under legislation in respect of affordability, local authorities 
are required to have regard to all those aspects of the Prudential Code that relate to 
affordability, sustainability and prudence. In particular the following prudential indicators are 
key indicators of affordability.
Looking ahead for a three-year period: 
• estimates of the ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream
• estimates of the incremental impact of capital investment decisions on the council tax
After the year end: 
• actual ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream.
The prudential indicators required by the code are designed to support and record local 
decision making. They are not designed to be comparative performance indicators because 
local authorities had widely different debt positions at the time of introduction of the 
current system of self-regulation and differences may have increased over time as a result of 
local choices.
10. it is also widely recognised that borrowing by local government is always on the basis of 
affordability and always for investment generating social or economic returns, whereas 
borrowing by central government is often for current consumption. 
11. Local government’s finances must be seen in a wider context. UK sub-national government 
enjoys financial management of a high standard. It is governed by clear statutory duties 
on designated officers and a strong professional code of practice, its accounts are rarely 
qualified and its overall financial position is strong. Local authorities, unlike central 
government, cannot borrow to fund revenue spending. local authority net debt was 
£45.3bn as at March 2012, or £53.7bn including long-term liabilities (eg PFI and finance 
leases). london accounts for about 10 per cent of these totals. local government in Britain 
represents only a small fraction of the UK’s total public sector net debt. Local authorities 
have to maintain appropriate levels of reserves. they have done so in the past and by 
international standards, therefore, have proved themselves to be consistent over time and 
also prudent. 
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figure 2: Public sector and local authority borrowing
Source: Office for National Statistics39 
12. despite this prudence, local government saw some of the sharpest budget cuts in the 
2010 spending review40 and the sector has raised concerns over its continuing ability to 
resource its statutory services in the light of expected future spending reductions. The 
LGA’s Funding Outlook for 2010/11 to 2019/20 explains:
“…our model shows a likely funding gap of £16.5 billion a year by 2019/20, or a 29 per cent 
shortfall between revenue and spending pressures… On the assumption that demand in 
social care and waste are fully funded, other services face cash cuts of more than 66 per 
cent by the end of the decade. Assuming that capital financing and concessionary fares are 
also funded in full, the modelled cash cut for remaining services rises to over 90 per cent… 
which, in real terms, leaves practically no funding for them at all. Reductions on this scale 
would be highly likely to leave councils vulnerable to legal challenge. Many of these service 
blocks have statutory elements.” 41 
13. These future budget uncertainties and its single, capped source of tax revenue mean that 
local government as a whole is unable to make significant investments of its own. Revenue 
constraints inhibit capital spending.
14. We consider that in London (and elsewhere), there is significant scope for delivering more 
consistent and cost-effective services at the local level. Further financial devolution would 
encourage this improvement to happen and, most importantly, would enable greater 
borrowing for investment that should catalyse growth. 
39 With permission, taken from the report: Travers, T. (2012), ‘Local government’s role in promoting economic growth, Removing 
unnecessary barriers to success’ (an independent report commissioned by the lga), p13
40 The Spending Review 2010 forecast a -27 per cent cumulative real growth for the departmental budget of DCLG Local 
Government between 2010/11 and 2014/15, with funding for police and fire authorities excluded the Local Government 
DEL was forecast to fall by -28 per cent. Source: HM Treasury Spending Review 2010, http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/sr2010_
completereport.pdf 
41 LGA, ‘Funding outlook for councils from 2010/11 to 2019/20: Preliminary modelling’, p1 and p10 (http://www.local.gov.uk/c/
document_library/get_file?uuid=c98405b7-b4a6-4b25-aebf-a63b5bcfa5c1&groupId=10171) 
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15. Furthermore, at least for the GLA Group, HM Treasury has sought to impose additional 
controls over and above the prudential borrowing regime. It has provided a schedule in 
the London Settlement letter which sets and limits GLA’s non-Crossrail borrowing; and it 
sets explicit annual borrowing ceilings for TfL42. We believe these should be removed (see 
below for housing finance). 
16. Fiscal devolution would enable somewhat more local authority borrowing within the 
prudential regime. But it would also increase the temptation on the part of central 
government to introduce new controls to ensure that its borrowing targets are met. on 
an important point of national policy, we argue that London and other cities should not 
be further constrained in this way and that the Government should differentiate between 
debts that are incurred for the purpose of delivering economic growth that will, over time, 
enable them to be repaid and, on the other hand, borrowing to fund general government 
debt. Local government cannot currently differentiate in this way between borrowing for 
different kinds of expenditure. 
17. capital investment is a priority in london, a large and growing city. if london became 
more capable of fiscal self-determination it could have the freedom to decide the 
proportion of its resources to devote to investment. A city which depends heavily on 
physical infrastructure will be more likely than the country as a whole to spend on 
investment rather than consumption. The capital should therefore be able to borrow as 
much as it can prudently afford, without any further intervention, an approach that could 
also be adopted for other cities. The Government could, of course, oversee these kinds of 
growth-promoting local investments but it should not constrain them. 
18. it would be important to ensure that if london were given greater freedom to invest 
in infrastructure which was intended to generate increased economic output that it 
would not be subject to pound-for-pound reductions in its spending power. In its written 
evidence submission, the london Borough of islington stated:
“There may even be a case for a separate revenue funding settlement for London [… ] 
which more closely reflects London’s needs and contribution to the national economy 
although this would need detailed discussion to ensure an appropriate balance between 
the interests of London and the rest of the country – work on this could be aligned on any 
review of Barnett funding affecting the devolved administrations.”
19. Central government’s existing mechanisms to control public expenditure operate in 
such a way that no area of the country can spend in excess of HM Treasury-imposed 
limits. There is modest freedom within ‘local self-financed expenditure’, but only at the 
margins of overall spending. The proposals we make here can only be effective if any 
additional growth generated as the result of reform can be held locally and re-invested. 
The recent report from the House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform 
Committee proposed a constitutional codification of relations between central and local 
government43. such a move, if it occurred might allow london (and other) areas greater 
autonomy to hold resources generated. Alternatively, it might be possible to ring-fence 
London’s grant support using a Barnett Formula-type mechanism. It would be essential 
that if greater autonomy were granted there should be no clawback of resources if there 
were additional growth and expenditure above what would otherwise have been the case.
42 London Settlement letter, http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor-assembly/gla/spending-money-wisely/budget-expenditure-charges/
the-mayors-budget-for-2013-14 
43 Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, ‘Prospects for codifying the relationship between central and local government’, 
Third Report, Session 2012-13 42
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housing finanCe
20. as discussed in part 3, chapter 1, capital investment in housing is failing to meet need. 
Responsibility for overseeing, planning and delivering housing in london is shared 
between the mayor and the boroughs. there have been welcome moves towards greater 
devolution of housing and regeneration responsibilities through the GLA Act 2007 and the 
localism act 2011, both to the mayor and to local government. however, these reforms 
do not go far enough and both tiers of London government will find it increasingly difficult 
to meet their strategic priorities and to maximise opportunities to increase supply because 
of the constraints that remain. We consider different solutions below that would help to 
increase housing provision. 
stable investment in housing
21. only stability of funding can deliver stability of housing supply. the gla is now able 
to invest directly in housing for the first time in its history, complementing its existing 
powers on planning and infrastructure. however, funding for many housing programmes 
continues to be allocated on a piecemeal, short-term basis by central government. 
London’s ability to increase the supply of new homes of all tenures will only be optimised 
with long-term and stable financial resources such as through devolved property taxes. 
22. london’s boroughs could also become important players in the delivery of new homes 
following the 2012 reform of the HRA system. The settlement left London boroughs with 
significant borrowing headroom of £1.4 billion but the government has imposed a fixed 
cash limit on hRa debt which prevents sustainable borrowing for investment, including for 
new housing development. 
23. We recommend the removal or revision of boroughs’ debt caps, which could generate 
a significant increase in council house building and deliver complex estate regeneration 
projects. This does not open the door to unrestricted or unaffordable borrowing as the 
boroughs would remain subject to both prudential borrowing limits and the rigour of 
the long-term HRA business plans, which were a further feature of the 2012 reforms. 
Indeed it is estimated that the increased borrowing would be modest compared with 
government borrowing overall44. It would, however, allow for a significant and affordable 
investment in new housing schemes, which would both help meet needs and contribute 
to economic growth.
the longer-term: shifting from personal to building subsidy in housing
24. Direct subsidy for development has been a feature of British housing policy since 1919. 
from the 1970s onwards, the nature of housing subsidy has been characterised by a steep 
decline in ‘bricks and mortar’ subsidy, and increasing personal subsidies, of which housing 
benefit has been the dominant form for a number of years. Over the last ten years, 
london has received just over £17 billion of capital investment to build new or improve 
existing homes; this compares with a total housing benefit bill of £50 billion for the same 
period. It is, therefore, right to explore if housing benefit could work more strategically 
and be better aligned with the policy objectives of investment in affordable housing. 
25. In response to our call for written evidence, we received a submission from IPPR which 
proposed that all capital and revenue housing expenditure allocated for London should 
44 Heriot-Watt University and University of York, ‘UK Housing Review 2013’, March 2013
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be devolved to London. This would move away from national rates and entitlements for 
housing benefit, in order to shift the balance in favour of house building. To afford London 
the power to invest in and shape the capital’s housing market, it is proposed that devolved 
housing expenditure should be combined with greater borrowing powers against housing 
assets and future rental income. We encourage further assessment of the ippR’s proposals 
of this time, taking into account the considerations we make below.
26. While there is a case for devolving housing benefit to London, in view of wider welfare 
reforms, in particular the introduction of Universal Credit, devolving housing benefit in 
isolation would be problematic. There would also be transitional challenges in terms 
of how existing low-income households in the private rented sector would continue to 
pay their rent. Given that there is unlikely to be additional funding in the short term to 
mitigate the transitional costs, the relaxation of borrowing controls is the only obvious 
solution to enable the delivery of greater supply. This, over time, would allow reduced 
dependence on high-cost privately rented housing for low-income households. The 
broader devolution and assignment of property and other taxes is necessary as a long-
term funding stream to repay debt and to enable London government as a whole to shift 
more of its resources into housing capital investment.
27. An additional challenge in any attempt to shift away from revenue to capital subsidy 
through control of benefit are the transitional consequences for low income households in 
receipt of benefit that continue to pay high rents while funds flow out of benefits and into 
home building. Additional funding would be required to mitigate these transitional costs. 
ConClusion
28. We consider that London government should become, as far as possible, self-funding 
by retaining more of the resources it raises. At the same time we accept that, at least at 
the outset, this would lead to a proportionately lower grant from central government. 
Such a reform would give it greater incentives to create additional growth, with the 
autonomy to reinvest additional tax yields as it sees appropriate. This move would create 
the opportunity for london government to invest in projects that produce a higher level 
of tax, from which both London and national government would benefit. Moreover, the 
increased responsibility for spending more resources would likely lead to more scrutiny 
of spending decisions at the London level, arguably resulting in more considered and 
effective spending decisions over time. A more devolved system of this kind implies both a 
need to remove government borrowing limits on london government (while retaining the 
prudential borrowing code) and need to devolve revenue streams in the form of taxation 
to London government. The latter point is explored further in Part 4. 
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reCoMMendations 
R5: the Government and London should explore more radical approaches to building 
incentives for London government into the tax system, similar to those proposed for 
Greater manchester.
R6:  the mayor and London’s local authorities should determine which tiF projects to 
proceed with, within the prudential borrowing code. the potential for locally led 
tiFs would be increased through the devolved fiscal measures we propose in part 4. 
meanwhile, the Government should start with a presumption in favour of funding all 
tiF projects that can demonstrate net gains to public finances as a whole (through, at 
the national and/or local level, increasing the tax yield or reducing public expenditure 
or both) after adjusting for risk.
R7:  the Government should distinguish between borrowing that will be used to promote 
growth or reduce public expenditure and thus be repaid, and other kinds of debt.
R8:  in light of the robust and effective prudential borrowing regime, GLa Group borrowing 
ceilings should be removed. 
R9:  alongside the recommendations for fiscal devolution we make in part 4, the 
Government should continue to allow local authorities to take independent borrowing 
and investment decisions within the prudential code, imposing no further constraints. 
R10:  a mechanism is required which will ensure that any reform made to London’s fiscal 
and financing arrangements are not negated by government periodically adjusting 
grant resources available to the city beyond the reduction required at the point of 
reform to ensure there is no shift of resources between London and the rest of the uK.
R11:  the borrowing limits for housing purposes for boroughs should be relaxed or removed. 
prudential borrowing rules would still apply, as would the rigour of long-term hRa 
business plans. 
R12: the devolution of housing benefit, or a related share of universal credit, to London 
should be considered, and the necessary transitional arrangements explored. 
R13: we recommend that measures to shift public funding from personal subsidy to 
investment in built assets should be further explored. this will require an appropriate 
capital settlement for London from central government in future spending Reviews 
and Budgets. it will also require appropriate revenue funding for the transition phase. 
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4 fiscal  powers
The previous section of this report sets out the 
increasing demands for capital investment in 
London and explains the shortcomings of the 
current system, which, in our view, is unlikely to 
provide the necessary infrastructure for London’s 
economic and population growth. Part 4 considers 
in detail a number of options that would diversify 
London’s revenue streams and afford it the 
autonomy to cater for its own spending needs in 
future. It makes a number of recommendations 
to improve London’s financing system including 
through devolving taxes. 
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paRt 4, chapteR 1
Introduction to fiscal devolution
1. Virtually all the evidence we have reviewed argues that London government could and 
should have greater financial autonomy, through tax devolution and assignment. 
tax devolution and assignment
At present almost all most taxes collected in the UK are paid to central government and 
spent and/or redistributed according to its priorities. Tax devolution allows sub-national 
government to raise some (or all) of its own tax revenues, delivering accountability and 
removing dependence on grant. But in some cases such reform has the potential to 
introduce distortions. 
Local tax assignment is where a proportion of a national tax collected in a local area 
is assigned to the relevant tier of sub-national government, in place of some (or all) of 
its grant.
Benefits of assignment are that it is more transparent than a grant settlement, meaning 
central government can have less influence over spending decisions, and that it can 
generally provide a buoyant form of revenue. if growth in the yield of any assigned 
revenues can be held locally they can have an incentive effect because of the link between 
the taxes raised and the revenues available to the area concerned. Assignment does not 
introduce economic distortions because central government still controls tax rates. 
However, assigning taxes does not increase the fiscal accountability of sub-national 
government, as the tax rates from which it is assigned a share are not determined 
locally. The system can be inflexible as sub-national government has to accept falls in tax 
receipts but has no power to adjust tax levels. Even in the event of windfalls, sub-national 
government may not have the power to pass benefits on to local taxpayers by lowering 
tax rates.
2. Any devolved or assigned taxes should be met with an equal and opposite reduction in 
central government grants at the point of reform, insofar as would be necessary to ensure 
fiscal neutrality at the outset, but with mechanisms in place to allow London government  
to retain any additional growth which may arise to re-invest over time. 
3. Moreover, the international evidence we commissioned suggests London is a significant 
outlier as compared to other major cities. It is rare, if not unique, for city government to 
have as little fiscal freedom as London. There is also a powerful democratic argument for 
allowing sub-national governments a reasonable degree of autonomy. Unless sub-national 
governments have both an electoral mandate and the power to raise resources, there 
is a risk that over-centralised national government will operate in a way that precludes 
pluralism and innovation. London and other cities in England fall well short of respectable 
international standards in terms of their freedom to direct their own finances. We therefore 
believe there is an unanswerable case for additional fiscal autonomy in London, in ways set 
out in this section.
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4. Substantial devolution would certainly improve the current situation against the principles 
we have adopted. In particular, it would: 
• improve accountability by linking more closely locally raised revenues to decisions on 
the use of those revenues
• better align policy towards the needs of local areas, reducing for instance the number of 
grants with inappropriate strings attached 
• be more efficient and effective, reducing local government’s need to bid to central 
government for funding
• provide London government with greater autonomy
• offer the scope for London government to simplify the system in the interests of 
transparency
• rebalance the power dynamic between central government and the democratically 
elected leaders of the UK’s largest and only global city.
5. it is evident that governance arrangements and mechanisms may need to be developed 
to accommodate our proposed changes in an appropriate way. We turn to the matter of 
governance arrangements in part 5 of the report.
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paRt 4, chapteR 2 
emerging concepts of  
devolution to cities
introduCtion
1. We have undertaken our work in full acknowledgement of the fact that devolution to 
English sub-national government has been modest at best, particularly in comparison 
to the increasing dynamic towards more significant devolution to Scotland and Wales. 
However, while Government responses and the concrete legacies of Layfield and Lyons 
were minimal, we welcome recent movements towards devolution to cities that have 
emerged in part from the government’s business rate retention scheme and Lord 
Heseltine’s 2012 review of local growth. In this chapter we consider the implications for 
London of these developments, and look to the further potential they present.
CoMMunity Budgets
2. Community Budget Pilots, exemplified by the tri-borough project in London, are an 
excellent example of local leaders taking on the stewardship of place advocated by Sir 
michael lyons in his evidence to us and in his comprehensive review of local government 
finance. The principle of local autonomy to direct budgets and transcend Whitehall 
departmental rigidities is welcome and should be extended. Progressing from the 
experimental nature of the Community Budget Pilots towards ‘single pots’ drawn from 
existing Whitehall budgets is the logical next step in liberating sub-national government 
from unnecessary constraints, and we propose the further development of ‘single pot’ 
schemes in london.
 The London-wide level should not be discounted for some specific responsibilities, and 
we can see merit in exploring ‘single pots’ involving health, education, skills and welfare. 
But in the main it is important that ‘single pot schemes’ operate at the appropriate spatial 
level and it is likely they would generally be based on individual boroughs or groups of 
boroughs, such as the existing tri-borough arrangement in inner-west London. The West 
end commission, set up by Westminster city council and chaired by sir howard Bernstein, 
has proposed more effective joint working within central London, involving boroughs, the 
gla, tfl and the metropolitan police. it states that: “a new leadership and governance 
model is required, but getting this right extends beyond the West End” 45. We endorse this 
idea. 
3. The evidence we received from local authorities and London Councils demonstrated 
particular interest in the further devolution of budgets for skills and employment 
programmes. The voluntary sector delivery organisation Tomorrow’s People supported 
this approach in its evidence to the Commission, explaining:
“The GLA has responsibility for discrete areas of public service such as transport and 
police, however, it doesn’t have responsibility for unemployment and related benefits, for 
education or the criminal justice system, as these are managed nationally. This means that 
some savings gained by effective preventative work in London are enjoyed by national 
government, rather than at borough level. Any changes to financial arrangements 
must recognise that responsibilities will always be distributed across different layers of 
45 West End Commission, Final Report, April 2013, p4, (also pages 27-34)
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government. Should greater devolution of financial powers to London deliver savings, the 
GLA and boroughs should take advantage of that freedom to seek out preventative and 
innovative work. London-based spending offers more opportunity for innovative ideas 
and improved support through a flexible pot of money. […] Funding needs to allow third 
sector organisations, in particular, to work more responsively to local conditions and client 
situations and for this to happen, more financial power must be devolved from central to 
London’s government.”
City deals
4. City Deals are another welcome development. Concepts of recognising local differences, 
incentivising growth, ensuring robust governance arrangements and making confident 
offers back to central government are all prudent steps in building stronger sub-national 
tiers of government. The Manchester ‘Earn Back’ scheme is a particularly significant 
development, as it recognises the ability of local government to incentivise additional 
growth and allows the city region to retain additional tax yields created, beyond the 
business rate base (please see part 3, chapter 2).
5. London’s scale, both economically and spatially, means a London City Deal would probably 
be inappropriate. However, our recommendations pay due regard to the principles of 
other city deals, and the spirit of mature dialogue with central government about the 
capital’s clear potential for growth underpins our recommendations. Moreover, the 
potential exists for City Deal-type approaches to be agreed between City Hall and groups 
of boroughs should greater devolution for London be secured from the centre. We believe 
there is a strong argument for the mayor to develop a london version of city deals, 
potentially brokering bespoke arrangements in specific zones of the capital, including 
some of the elements included in those agreed by dclg for places outside the capital, 
such as transport or skills. The West End Commission’s proposals could, for example, be 
met by a ‘city deal’ type arrangement for central london. other parts of the city would 
also be able to bid for equivalent status.
lord heseltine: No StoNe UNtUrNed
6. We support Lord Heseltine’s approach to incentivising local growth in cities by dismantling 
central silos and transferring the power to determine growth-related spending to cities 
through a ‘central growth fund’. this proposal is consistent with our view and links to 
existing agendas around City Deals and Community Budget Pilots. His focus on transferring 
powers to use skills funding locally is supported by much of the evidence we received, and 
we would support a greater ability at the local level to incentivise better outcomes from 
skills funding. 
7. However, while we acknowledge the sense of this pragmatic approach and are encouraged 
by the Government’s acceptance of many of Lord Heseltine’s recommendations, we 
believe that greater potential exists to move away from the top-down system of bidding 
for funding and approval from central government, towards more mature arrangements 
in line with those soon to be enjoyed in scotland and which are already present in many 
comparable international cities. Our recommendations are ambitious but in line with 
London’s economic potential. 
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ConClusion
8. Recent initiatives, as detailed above, are a prelude to more significant fiscal devolution, 
and as such they are welcome steps in right direction. The following chapters set out 
our ambitious recommendations for the next stage in the empowerment of London and 
potentially other cities and city regions.
reCoMMendations
R14: we recommend that central government should extend the remit and scale of 
community Budget pilots through ‘single pots’ devolved from existing whitehall 
budgets. 
R15: in our recommended model of London government, the mayor of London should 
work with boroughs and groups of boroughs to create ‘city deal’-type initiatives 
within London. 
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paRt 4, chapteR 3 
Property taxes 
46 The research we commissioned from the University of Toronto demonstrated that Frankfurt sets a property tax; Madrid 
determines a property tax, a tax on construction and a tax on land value increase; Paris sets a property tax on developed land, a 
property tax on undeveloped land, a residence tax, a local economic contribution tax on business premises and real estate taxes 
on land transfers; Tokyo determines an inhabitant tax, a real property acquisition tax, a special tax on land holding, an urban 
planning tax and an accommodation tax; Berlin has a land tax (at city level) and a real estate transfer tax (at state level); New York 
determines real estate taxes, a hotel room occupancy tax, a commercial rent tax and a tax on the conveyance of real property.
1. The evidence we received and reviewed showed merit in and an appetite for greater 
local fiscal powers. In our view, the starting point for delivering such autonomy should be 
property taxes (business rates, council tax, stamp duty land tax and the new annual tax 
on enveloped dwellings and capital gains property disposal tax), which are to some extent 
under the aegis of local government already (including in their widest sense through 
existing Section 106 powers and the recent introduction of the Community Infrastructure 
Levy). Property taxes are suitable for local control because of their immobile bases, the 
fact they are easy to collect and enforce, and insofar as they relate to land, they are 
economically efficient. In the international cities we have reviewed, property taxes are 
largely devolved to sub-national government46. 
2. Evidence we received suggested that both the design and operation of property taxes 
in Britain are inefficient, regressive and subject to ad hoc reform. In addition, they work 
particularly awkwardly in London’s property market. Stamp duty, for example, has a 
disproportionate impact in London, where the brunt of its burden is borne as the result 
of there being a large number of high-value properties in the capital. If wrongly handled 
stamp duty could act as a block to economic growth and detrimentally distort the housing 
market. Many argue that reform of these taxes in the capital is required and, indeed, 
overdue. We believe that introducing the possibility of London-focused changes to these 
centrally-designed taxes could make London’s property market work more effectively and, 
in so doing, promote additional growth. 
3. in this chapter we include detailed proposals about how london government could take 
control of property taxes. We recommend that the full suite of property taxes (council tax, 
business rates, stamp duty, annual tax on enveloped dwellings and capital gains property 
development tax) should be devolved to London government which should have devolved 
responsibility for setting the tax rates and authority over all matters including revaluation, 
banding and discounts. The yields of these newly devolved taxes should be offset through 
corresponding reductions in grant to ensure a fiscally neutral position for the Exchequer, 
at the outset. If all property taxes were transferred to London government in this way, 
their yield would represent at least 50 per cent of the income required to fund all existing 
GLA and borough services apart from schools, which are now almost entirely financed by 
central grants. 
Business ProPerty taxes 
4. We consider business rates a good starting point for reform not least because, with 
their direct links to business activity, a well-designed system under local control would 
introduce potential incentive effects and could promote growth. 
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Full retention
5. Apart from minor changes, the way the business rate system affects ratepayers has not 
changed significantly in recent years. However, a major reform to the system came into 
force in april 201347. A dual system of redistributing business rates now operates, first 
through local authority retention of 50 per cent of their rates yield and, second, through 
a system of’ top up’ and ‘tariff’ payments against a fixed baseline. This latter arrangement 
was designed to stop a redistribution of resources at the point the new system was 
introduced. In addition, central government revenue support grants continue to be paid. 
While local authorities have welcomed the movement towards fiscal devolution that 
the new system involves, most have criticised it for being complex and bureaucratic. 
Incentives to promote economic growth are weak and no incentives are built in to 
develop and capture land values. Rather, incentives serve mainly to increase the amount 
of property stock, which puts highly developed urban areas such as central london at a 
disadvantage. Camden expressed the following view in its evidence to us:
“The new business rates retention system offers the prospect of growth in business rates 
providing some additional funds for local government but again central government 
determines what is growth (physical growth) and what isn’t (revaluation growth) and 
leaves local government with half of the former and none of the latter.”
6. In London, we believe a number of steps need to be taken to improve the operation 
of retained business rates. We agree with the many local authorities and London First 
who argued that all of london’s business rates should be retained in london, in line 
with the Government’s original reform proposals which were subsequently watered 
down. We recommend that 100 per cent of business rates should be devolved to london 
government, through an appropriate governance mechanism, including the responsibility 
for the timing of revaluations. London government should be free to determine such 
issues as discounts and tax breaks, and should have the freedom to use business rates to 
undertake ‘Enterprise Zone’-style interventions. 
7. The London-retained share should commensurately increase and central government 
grants, at the outset, should reduce by an equal amount to ensure fiscal neutrality for the 
Exchequer. For 2013/14 this share is estimated to be £3.2bn. 
8. Which grants, or mix of grants, would reduce and how the newly retained business rates 
would be split between the gla and the boroughs would, of course, be decided through 
the proposed new governance arrangements and discussion with the government. such 
a reform could, for instance, dispense with the complex dual system of funding, involving 
retained business rates and grant, which the Government is currently operating. It 
would also double the incentive to support business growth and would result in London 
businesses funding more of London’s expenditure directly. We agree with John Dickie 
of London First, who presented oral evidence to us, on the need for a combination of 
intelligibility and certainty in an improved business rates system.
47 from 1 april 2013 business rates in london are distributed as follows: 30 per cent to the boroughs, 20 per cent to the gla group 
and 50 per cent to DCLG. A system of ‘tariffs’ and ‘top-ups’ was introduced to equalise and protect authorities which might 
otherwise gain or lose from the 2013 reform. DCLG also continues to pay revenue support grant to local authorities from its 50 
per cent share – another form of equalisation and protection which has evolved from the previous system, under which DCLG 
received 100 per cent of business rates and redistributed them. There are also protections for those authorities witnessing large 
declines in their business rate base (over 7.5 per cent per annum) and a levy on tariff authorities experiencing significant absolute 
growth compared to their funding baseline. Overall the system introduces an incentive for the GLA and local authorities to 
maintain and grow the business rate base. 
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Business engagement
9. Business voices have made it clear that they would prefer more of the business rates 
they generate to be used to fund services related to the successful functioning of the 
economy, such as transport, skills, housing, and other economic development activities. 
according to lcci’s report driving local growth: the Business case :
“The success of Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) is proof that businesses are 
prepared to pay more in business rates, but only because firms know those taxes will 
go towards investment in their locality. If councils are permitted to keep a proportion of 
increases in rateable values, it is vital that they commit to developing a new relationship 
with their business community.” 48
10. In its written evidence submissions, the London Borough of Kingston Upon Thames also 
highlighted the success of the Bid model in its local area.
11. We agree that businesses voices should have a place in sub-national governance 
and could productively offer advice to aid economic development. However, core 
local authority services will continue to be funded through business rates and local 
government will remain accountable for meeting residents’ needs and fulfilling statutory 
responsibilities. In full recognition of the core role of local government, if London 
government were to take full control of business rates, it could provide local businesses 
with a greater opportunity to be involved in decision making about the use of the 
resources raised through their operations, potentially through the LEP but also directly 
with the boroughs. 
12. Businesses and residents have demonstrated willingness to pay additional taxes 
and charges in recent years when properly consulted. the crossrail business rate 
supplement, the congestion charge and the council tax precept for the 2012 Games, 
have mainly proved acceptable because they were ring-fenced for a particular purpose 
and because of the benefits they have delivered.
13. In order to ensure business buy-in, it would be possible to develop a mechanism for 
business ratepayers to trigger a referendum if they believed any annual increase in 
the multiplier was excessive, especially as we propose the local determination of the 
multiplier (please see below). We recommend that if business rates are localised in the 
way we propose then london government should put in place a scheme that would 
protect ratepayers from any perceived risk of unreasonably high rate increases, in 
consultation with business. 
14. it is impossible to specify precisely which grants should be reduced if business rates 
were localised, given that they tend to change each year and, as stated above, such 
decisions should be made jointly by london government. however, we do recommend 
that any adjustments that are made should be such that, at the point of reform, the gla 
and London boroughs would be no better or worse off than hitherto. 
15. While specifying the use of devolved funds is beyond our remit as a commission (this 
would be a political decision, subject to governance mechanisms agreed by the GLA and 
London Councils at the point of devolution) we have paid some thought, for illustrative 
purposes, to potential uses of a devolved business rate in order to demonstrate some 
possible effects and benefits. In our view, and only as an example, it is possible that 
as well as replacing revenue support grant in London, the GLA share of the additional 
business rate yield retained could substitute (in whole or in part) existing grants for 
48 lcci (2012), ‘driving local growth: the business case’, p2
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housing, transport or other of the Group’s activities. Business rates are generally a 
buoyant tax whose yield would provide the GLA or TfL with a stable financial platform 
on which to plan over the long term, avoiding the vagaries of government spending 
Reviews. Other devolved taxes discussed below could be used in a similar way as London 
government becomes increasingly self-funded.
16. It is important to emphasise, however, that funding TfL or other GLA activities through 
business rates would not detract from the funding of local authorities. London’s boroughs 
deliver vital services, many of which are underpinned by statutory obligations, and these 
have always been, and continue to be in the new system of rates retention from April 
2013, funded to a significant extent by the proceeds of business rates. The example 
above refers only to the gla’s share of the business rate and any future decisions on 
how business rates yield should be apportioned must recognise the on-going need for 
borough services to be funded appropriately. the decision about how to determine the 
reduction in grant support that would be required as and when local fiscal power was 
increased would have, in the last resort, to be made by london government jointly and by 
agreement.
setting or varying powers
17. We have also considered whether or not london government should be able to set or 
vary the main business rate. Evidence was mixed on this matter; some supported the 
full localisation of the business rate, others have been adamantly opposed. On balance, 
we support london government having the ability to vary the main rate across greater 
London, with robust governance arrangements in place and in consultation with local 
authorities, the LEP and businesses directly, as this would substantially improve the 
autonomy and accountability of london government. 
18. At such a time that business rates were wholly retained in London, alongside other 
property taxes (as we recommend), London government should set the business rate 
multiplier in London, again in consultation with appropriate stakeholders49. the business 
rate multiplier would be linked to the rate of council tax. There would also need to 
be arrangements to ensure that all boroughs were treated equitably by the locally 
determined business rate.
19. Other parts of the UK currently receive income from London’s business rates via the tariffs 
and top up system and levies on central London authorities. In light of our principle of 
fairness, we have therefore considered whether or not this proposal would be detrimental 
to the rest of the country; overall, we have concluded it would not be so long as grants 
were adjusted appropriately. at the point that the reform came into force, we propose 
that changes should be fiscally neutral for the Exchequer by balancing any gains from 
additional business rates retained with reductions in grant that would otherwise be 
allocated to London. In any case, central government would still be responsible for the 
overwhelming majority of all tax revenues. A business rate pool or additional tariffs 
and top ups would ensure that London dealt with its own equalisation. Separating 
London’s business rate from the rest of England would bring potential longer-term risks 
and opportunities both for London and the rest of England. Therefore, we consider 
that our proposal would increase the momentum for further devolution of powers and 
responsibilities, which would be a welcome development. 
49 The City of London can set its own business rate because of its unique circumstances, being a major financial and business district 
with a small number of residents. We recognize that any reforms would need to take into account its particular requirements. 
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National reforms
20. We also received evidence that the business rate retention system does not incentivise 
action by local government to improve property values through, for instance, public realm 
improvements, only the amount of stock. major increases in business rate values can 
indicate wider economic regeneration, often on a very local scale, and local authorities 
should have incentives to carry out this work. We agree with those who have suggested 
that, in the short term at least, the system could be modified to enable local authorities 
to specify and benefit from valuation rises in ‘investment zones’ within their overall areas. 
the london Borough of camden put forward a proposal in its evidence submission that 
should be considered further: 
“Measures to revitalise high streets for example can include environmental and public 
realm improvements and crime reduction initiatives. If successful these measures will 
result in greater footfall, more trade and higher profits for the businesses in the area 
which in turn will result in time in an upward revaluation in rateable values. It is perverse 
that the local authority investing in these improvements will receive no benefit from this 
revaluation gain. We would suggest that authorities should be able to apply for streets to 
be designated as Local Action Zones in which they will invest in the public realm and that 
the local authority should benefit from any above average revaluation gain that results.”
21. Over time, we also consider that there is the potential to reform business rates along the 
lines of the Mirrlees Review so that it becomes a genuine business land tax based on real-
time valuations (rather than periodic revaluations)50.
taxation of derelict and undeveloped land and property
22. In his review of local government finance, Sir Michael Lyons recommended that “the 
Government should develop proposals for the taxation of derelict property and brownfield 
land and consult on those with stakeholders.” 51 We consider that his overall objective to 
bring underutilised land and property into more economic uses was right. However, we 
believe it would be more appropriate for the mayor and london’s boroughs to develop 
proposals, rather than central government. We recommend that further assessment be 
undertaken of the potential benefits and costs of new taxes such as these as part of the 
wider reforms of property taxation that we advocate. 
doMestiC ProPerty taxes 
council tax
23. The taxation of domestic property in England is in a state of complex evolution. Council 
tax, which was introduced in 1993, is regarded by national politicians as awkward and 
unpopular, mainly because of its visibility in comparison to many other taxes. Even though 
it represents less than five per cent of UK tax revenues, it has become heavily politically 
contested, in the sense that ministers, shadow ministers and think tanks comment on local 
tax levels and the behaviour of councils in a way that does not occur for other, often larger 
yielding taxes. 
24. Since 2011-12, council tax in London and elsewhere has been operated in such a way 
that councils set their annual tax increases at or below a central government-determined 
level. If they wish to increase council tax above this level, a referendum is triggered, with 
50 IFS, ‘Mirrlees Review’, Chapter 16.1.3 ‘Replacing Business Rates’ p376 - 379
51 Lyons Inquiry into Local Government, Final Report, Chapter 8 ‘Business Taxation’, p309
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costs to be borne locally. the same government that introduced the referendum has also 
brought in a paternalistic ‘freeze grant’ to reward councils for retaining previous levels. 
25. In spite of irregularities in its design and operation, successive Governments have left 
it unchanged. For example, no Government has been willing to trigger a revaluation of 
the council tax base, with the consequence that the tax is now operating on the basis of 
valuations undertaken in 1991. Given how dramatically the property market has changed 
since the point of last revaluation, particularly in London, it would be surprising if, overall, 
a revaluation did not lead to a substantial number of London properties having higher 
relative values now (compared to the rest of England). 
26. Unlike the domestic rates system that was abolished in 1990, council tax does not operate 
on the basis of a full range of values. Rather, all properties are attributed to one of eight 
bands of value, based on capital values in 1991. The ratio of tax paid from Band A (the 
lowest) to Band h (the highest) is 1:3. thus, a home in a london borough with a 2013 
value of £25 million is likely to pay just three times the council tax of one with a value of 
£250,000. The Lyons Inquiry suggested that council tax as a proportion of new household 
income fell sharply for those in the top income groups52. Again, this seems like an irrational 
way to operate a tax that in other ways receives so much ‘corrective’ attention from the 
Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government. 
27. We accept that council tax is highly visible and politically-salient. But we also believe that 
domestic property tax has a continuing part to play in the system of public finance in 
London and that it must function efficiently and effectively. We recommend that council 
tax be retained as a local tax but that London government should be given the power and 
be required to hold periodic revaluations (undertaken by the Valuation Office, according to 
national practice), to determine the number of bands, to set the ratio of tax from band to 
band and to set the tax rate. A fully localised council tax of this kind would be part of a suite 
of local property taxes determined by London government. 
stamp duty land tax
28. Council tax is not the only tax on domestic property in use in the UK. Introduced in 2003, 
stamp duty is an Exchequer tax on property transactions levied on the buyer. Since its 
introduction, tax rates have increased (without the requirement for any referenda), in large 
part as a way of raising revenues (and, in our view, at least in part to make up for stagnating 
council tax yields in a less visible way). For properties worth in excess of £2m, the current 
rate of stamp duty is seven per cent. Because so many of the UK’s most expensive homes 
are in London, the yield of stamp duty is disproportionately derived from the capital (33.3 
per cent of the overall yield 2010/11, in a city that makes up only 13 per cent of the UK 
population), and 79 per cent of the yield from the seven per cent band. 
annual tax on enveloped dwellings, capital gains property disposal tax
29. From April 2013, a new annual tax on enveloped dwellings will be levied on company-
owned homes worth over £2 million. there will be four bands, with the top band (for 
properties valued at more than £20 million) paying £140,000 per annum. Also from April 
2013, capital gains tax will be chargeable on the disposal of high-value UK residential 
property. the charge will apply to companies registered both in the UK and abroad. in 
addition, UK companies will be liable for corporation tax on capital gains realised before 
april 201353. The 2012 Budget explained that these changes were introduced to deliver 
fairness and to stop tax avoidance.
52 Lyons Inquiry into Local Government, Final Report, Chapter 7 ‘Household taxation and local charges’, Chart 7.3 p 228
53 hm treasury, ‘Budget 2012’, hc 1853, paragraph 1.195
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30. London properties will produce the bulk of the yield from the annual tax on enveloped 
dwellings and the extended capital gains tax and from the higher rates of stamp duty. The 
estimated yield of each of these taxes and of council tax for London and the UK is shown 
in table 2 below. 
table 2: selected forecast tax yields in London and the uK for 2013/14 (£ million)54
london uk london %
Council tax 3390 27400 12%
Business rates 6245 26700 23%
Stamp duty land tax 2567 7700 33%
Annual tax on enveloped dwellings 36 45 80%
Capital gains property disposal tax 20 25 80%
Sources: HM Treasury & Office for Budget Responsibility55, Oxford Economics and GLA Economics calculations56.
31. While it is evident that London, because of the number of high-value properties in the 
city, has become the target of new taxation, it is not clear what the overall purpose of the 
system of four taxes is supposed to achieve, nor are we convinced that these taxes work 
effectively for London. Council tax appears to be in decline, while the other three taxes 
have recently been introduced. 
32. In our view, these four domestic property taxes would be appropriate for transfer to 
London government. The fact that a high proportion of the yield of the taxes aimed at 
high-value properties is raised in London suggests there would be a role for London 
government in managing the wider challenges that these new taxes appear to be 
attempting to tackle, such as fairness. As a Commission, it is beyond our remit to 
recommend how the domestic property systems should function. However, we do 
emphasise the important fact that if property taxes were transferred, London government 
would inherit the responsibility to decide how the system should work. if it chose to do so, 
it could rebalance the burden between domestic and non-domestic property taxation and 
offer exemptions or discounts where it saw fit, in a way that could promote growth. 
33. moreover, it would be possible for london government, with appropriate decision making 
structures in place, to manage the suite of domestic property taxes in a way that made it 
possible to decide on appropriate responses to matters such as revaluations and banding. 
As discussed above, we suspect that the failure to hold revaluations and to reset the ratio 
of council tax paid from band to band has produced a situation where the government has 
felt the need to add entirely new property taxes aimed at top-value homes. Had domestic 
rates continued to exist in their pre-1990 form, and had there been regular revaluations 
under that system, very high-value homes might well be paying council tax bills several 
times existing top council tax levels. The political reticence of national politicians to 
administer council tax properly should not be allowed to impede growth and distort the 
london property market in this way.
54 UK data is forecast by the Office for Budget Responsibility and taken from the March 2013 Budget. For London no such published 
forecast numbers exist for 2013/14 and assumptions have been made to forecast these numbers. For council tax, business rates 
and stamp duty it was assumed that the ratio of London’s taxes to UK taxes would not change between 2010/11 and 2013/14 
(which was seen as the most conservative realistic assumption to make), this ratio was then calculated from the published 
numbers for 2010/11 in the Oxford Economics report and applied to the UK numbers for 2013/14 to calculate London’s values. 
For annual tax on enveloped dwellings and capital gains property disposal tax it is know that previously around 80 per cent of the 
yield from the top stamp duty tax band came from London and this ratio was therefore applied to the UK yield for these taxes to 
calculate london’s values.
55 hm treasury, ‘Budget 2013’, march 2013
56 Oxford Economics, ‘London’s Finances and Revenues’
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34. in our proposed system london government would, therefore, be fully responsible for the 
operation and impact of council tax, stamp duty and other domestic property tax other 
than inheritance tax. It would be open to London government to make no reform at all, or, 
alternatively, to reform the operation and impact of the system. Such decisions would be 
made after the transfer of fiscal responsibility had occurred. Growth or contraction in the 
council tax base would be contained within London. 
reCoMMendations 
R16: we recommend that the full suite of property taxes (council tax, business rates, stamp 
duty, annual tax on enveloped dwellings and capital gains property development tax) 
should be devolved to london government which should have devolved responsibility 
for setting the tax rates and authority over all matters including revaluation, banding 
and discounts.
R17: the yields of these newly devolved taxes should be offset through corresponding 
reductions in grant to ensure a fiscally neutral position for the exchequer, at the 
outset. 
R18: specifically, we recommend that 100 per cent of business rates should be devolved to 
London government, through an appropriate governance mechanism, including the 
responsibility for the timing of revaluations. London government should be free to 
determine such issues as discounts and tax breaks, and should have the freedom to 
use business rates to undertake ‘enterprise Zone’-style interventions.
r19: if business rates are localised in the way we propose then london government should 
put in place a scheme that would protect ratepayers from any perceived risk of 
unreasonably high rate increases, in consultation with business. 
R20: at such a time that business rates were wholly retained in London, alongside other 
property taxes (as we recommend), London government should set the business rate 
multiplier in London, again in consultation with appropriate stakeholders.
R21: Further assessment should be undertaken of the potential benefits and costs of new 
taxes such as those on undeveloped land as part of the wider reforms of property 
taxation that we advocate. 
R22: council tax should be retained as a local tax but London government should be given 
the power and be required to hold periodic revaluations (undertaken by the valuation 
office, according to national practice), to determine the number of bands, to set the 
ratio of tax from band to band and to set the tax rate. a fully localised council tax 
of this kind would be part of a suite of local property taxes determined by London 
government.
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paRt 4, chapteR 4 
Radical tax reforms?
1. This chapter considers options for the devolution or assignment of existing taxes currently 
set and collected at the national level, and explores options for new local revenues. It 
locates the debate about these taxes in the context of arrangements in other devolved 
administrations within the UK and international cities. 
2. Devolving or assigning any taxes currently administered nationally would constitute 
relatively radical change from the current system but would be beneficial for London, 
according to research by the University of Toronto, which points to the benefits of cities 
having a portfolio of taxes at their disposal: 
“a mix of taxes would give London more flexibility to respond to local conditions such as 
changes in the economy, evolving demographics and expenditure needs, changes in the 
political climate, and other factors. A portfolio of taxes also would allow London to achieve 
revenue growth, revenue stability, and equity.” 57
inCoMe tax
3. Income tax is levied on an individual’s income above a threshold. It raises large revenues in 
London (£32.6bn in 2010/11 on a residence basis) and of all the higher-yielding taxes, it is 
the most obvious candidate for devolution. Many international cities derive income from a 
local income tax, including New York, Berlin, Madrid and Singapore. In the UK a precedent 
has been set in the Scotland Act, which introduced the Scottish rate of income tax58. 
4. However, potential problems are associated with the devolution of income tax59. 
Some international evidence suggests that higher rates of local income tax can have a 
detrimental effect on employment60, and london’s porous border may present scope 
for distortions61. The written and oral evidence received by the Commission did not 
demonstrate explicit support for a local income tax.
5. We consider that income tax is therefore not a priority for devolution; rather, the impetus 
should be for property taxes, which have a strong immobile base, to be devolved first 
(please see Part 4, Chapter 2). But at such a time, in future, that property taxes have been 
devolved to London, the option of devolving or assigning income tax to London should be 
revisited particularly as greater powers, for example in welfare, health or education, were 
in time devolved to London.
57 Slack, E. University of Toronto, ‘International Comparison of Global City Financing’, p25
58 From 2016, the Scottish rate of income tax will be calculated by reducing the basic, higher and additional rates of income tax 
levied by the UK government by 10 pence in the pound and adding a new equivalent Scottish rate set by the Scottish Parliament. 
59 We accept the premise that the council tax will remain in place. Therefore, our deliberations about a local income tax do not 
follow the logic of the Lyons report, which considers a local income tax as a replacement of council tax and therefore concludes 
that it would unfairly shift the tax burden from the non-working to the working population.
60 Slack, E. University of Toronto, ‘International Comparison of Global City Financing’, p21
61 However, we considered that within the overall context of many other ‘distortions’ and geographical differences in the economy, 
eg created by the impact of school results, train fares and other factors on house prices, an ability to vary income tax at the 
margin may have a negligible impact on activity and not a harmful one at that.
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NatioNaL iNsuRaNce, vat, coRpoRatioN tax
6. Although National Insurance Contributions (NICs), VAT and corporation tax are high 
yielding taxes (raising on a ‘residence’ basis £14.8bn, £12.8bn and £8.85bn respectively 
in London in 2010/11), we considered them unsuitable for devolution or assignment. VAT 
cannot be devolved because eU law prohibits varied rates within a member state, and its 
volatility anyway renders it unsuitable for assignment. NICs are not suitable because they 
are (theoretically, at least) hypothecated for nationally administered services such as 
pensions, which will remain at the national level. Corporation tax appears to be a potent 
lever for economic development and raises significant revenues in London, but there are 
a number of problems are associated with its devolution, including volatility, scope for 
distortions or a competitive ‘race to the bottom’, the challenge of state aid law and the 
difficulty of specifying geographical provenance. 
7. Smaller yielding taxes may not significantly increase financial autonomy but could be 
used as policy levers, as suggested by the london Borough of Waltham forest in its 
written evidence submission (new taxes could also function as policy levers, please 
see below). The Scotland Act devolved landfill duty to Scotland, and allowed for the 
option for further taxes to be devolved without the need for additional legislation, 
and aggregates duty and air passenger duty are being considered. Yet in spite of this 
precedent, we did not identify any compelling arguments to devolve smaller taxes to 
London at present. At such a time, in future, that London had greater financial autonomy, 
there may be a case to be made for devolving smaller taxes, such as air passenger duty 
and betting or gaming duties.
sMaller new taxes
8. The power to create smaller new taxes could modestly diversify London’s revenue base, 
but new taxes are unlikely to yield large revenues. Rather they would be of greater 
application as policy levers, enhancing the achievement of objectives in service areas for 
which London government has some responsibility, either as an incentive or a deterrent, 
or through hypothecation for specific purposes. 
9. We received evidence about a number of smaller new taxes, notably a tourist tax and 
environmental taxation. The international evidence we received suggested that all the 
other cities reviewed had one or more tax of this kind, including levies on sales, betting 
and alcohol. A tourism tax would seem to have particular potential in London because 
of the size and particular needs of the leisure and tourism industry. If the city’s cultural, 
tourist and entertainment industry are to flourish, there is a powerful argument for a 
levy that could then be reinvested in marketing and urban realm improvements. Similarly, 
allowing london government to introduce levies on, say, environmentally detrimental or 
unhealthy activity could assist in delivering wider public good objectives. We support the 
maximum discretion for the GLA and London boroughs in the use of such levies. 
10. The Scotland Act introduces permissive legislation to allow new taxes to be created in 
scotland, when agreed by the devolved and Westminster parliaments, and similar powers 
have been proposed for Wales. We see no reason why new taxes should not be created 
at the London level and we recommend that permissive legislation should be introduced 
to allow each new tax to be considered on a case-by-case basis.
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reCoMMendations
R23: London government should be able to introduce smaller new taxes, with the 
agreement of the westminster parliament. the Government should pass permissive 
legislation that would make such changes easy to implement.
R24: if greater powers are devolved to London over time, the assignment of income tax 
should be considered and should be viewed alongside more effective community 
Budget or ‘single pot’ arrangements.
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paRt 4, chapteR 5 
fees and charges
1. This chapter assesses existing and new opportunities for fees and service charging. It 
summarises our discussions about these topics and sets out our recommendations.
2. At present local authorities are able to levy charges on discretionary services if no profit 
is made and providing they are not prohibited by other legislation. This logic is sound but 
ignores the fact that in many important cases legislation states that fees and charges will 
be capped, set centrally or prohibited. evidence we received showed strong support for 
discretion around service charges. According to London Councils: 
“There are many services that local government has a statutory duty to deliver, but is 
required to charge for at a level determined by central government rather than local 
councillors. The result is that there are a number of services which leave councils with an 
overall net loss each year. This has always been perverse, militating against councils’ ability 
to work effectively with businesses, help drive growth and it also often has other significant 
financial consequences for local taxpayers.”
Planning aPPliCations fees
3. Evidence we received highlighted centrally imposed caps on planning application fees as 
particularly problematic for local authorities and for some businesses. London Councils 
and the City of Westminster called for deregulation and the freedom for local authorities 
to be able to set fees that allow full cost recovery. in his oral evidence to the commission, 
John Dickie of London First explained that the large businesses his organisation 
represents would be willing to pay the additional cost of swift, clear and high-quality 
advice from experts, as the cost of advice being given slowly and ineffectively is 
detrimental to business. 
4. DCLG maintains that its 2011 Localism Act represents a dramatic shift of power to local 
areas, yet in our view, localism will underachieve if Whitehall can still exercise the power 
to set single national levels of charges for services delivered by local authorities, in the 
face of clear demand from local businesses and locally elected leaders. the mayor of 
london has the power to set transport fares, despite their salience and scale of yield. local 
authorities should have the same ability to control the fees they charge for discretionary 
services and recover full costs, and should be able to offer differentiated services where 
appropriate, for example if consultations show that small and large businesses wish to 
make different choices about planning applications. Though local authorities should be 
able to recover full costs, due regard must be given to the impact of increased fees on 
economic activity and especially the impact on small and medium sized businesses. We 
recommend that a flexible approach should be taken to ensure that cost recovery is 
implemented in a rational and appropriate manner reflecting local circumstances and 
service user profiles.
5. london councils also highlighted charges for building control, land searches and licencing 
as other priorities for deregulation. We support such liberalisation and localism.
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Congestion Charging and road PriCing
6. The Mirrlees Review considers current arrangements for motoring taxation, through fuel 
duty and vehicle excise duty, as badly targeted policy levers, which fail to adequately 
address the problem of congestion, and as ultimately unsustainable sources of revenue if 
petrol and diesel use is to reduce in line with greenhouse gas targets.
7. The Mayor already levies a congestion charge, primarily as a policy lever to reduce traffic, 
but Mirrlees recommends that this tool should be extended to replace other motoring 
taxes, even in spite of the clear difficulties associated with a task of this scale. As the 
report explains: 
“Introducing national road pricing would be a huge and complex undertaking. It would 
involve significant political risks. But the scale of gains available is enough to persuade 
us that further steps towards road pricing must be a priority. With the congestion costs 
of driving an extra mile varying dramatically according to when and where people travel, 
the current range of taxes is nowhere close to being able to reflect the costs that different 
motorists impose on others. Moving to a system of charges would also open up the possibility 
of changing quite radically how the highway network is owned and financed. Proposals to 
switch to a system of user charges for a road system owned, regulated, and charged for in 
much the way we currently charge for other utilities deserve to be taken seriously.” 62
8. We do not consider a major extension of congestion charging or road pricing a feasible 
option for the short term. However, we recognise the likelihood that in such an extended 
system London would generate high yields, as traffic volumes are relatively high in 
london (glaister63) but could find that most of the revenue produced was absorbed by the 
Exchequer64. London government already has the power to use and extend road pricing and 
it would be a pity if, at some future point, central government imposed a national charging 
system which absorbed revenues into the Exchequer. We acknowledge the inevitable 
imperative to reform the taxation of vehicles and fuel, possibly leading to a national road 
pricing scheme. We believe such charges should be set and administered locally, with yields 
retained at the london level for use on roads and transport. 
reCoMMendations
R25: the number of nationally set charges should be kept to a minimum; locally determined 
charges should be the norm. 
R26: Local authorities should be able to recover full costs, even for charges set at the  
national level. 
R27: in particular, central controls should be removed on planning applications fees, building 
control charges, land searches and licencing fees. 
R28: in the longer term, London government should be responsible for administering any 
introduction of road charging that may replace vehicle excise duty, and yields should be 
retained locally.
62 IFS, ‘Mirrlees Review’, Chapter 10.2 ‘Taxes and Trading’ p273-274 
63 glaister, s. governing and paying for england’s Roads, p26 
64 glaister’s report ‘governing and paying for england’s Roads’ states on p56: “the revenue neutral policy would generate somewhat 
less overall net benefit, but it would make road users as a whole better off because the revenues would be returned to them and 
the road network is more efficiently used. A major feature of the revenue neutral policy is that it would transfer considerable sums 
of money from urban areas to rural areas, particularly from London. Unless compensation was made, such as a change in the 
local government finance regime, the residents of the urban areas would, as a group, be made worse off. Since a majority of the 
population lives in or near the urban areas a consequence could be that a large number of people would be made worse off and a 
small number would be made better off.” 
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5 Relationships within and outside london
In this part of the report we consider the practical 
implications of the recommendations we have made. 
The measures we propose in Part 4 would constitute 
significant change and would therefore require 
fair, robust and resilient governance structures and 
mechanisms to ensure that the distribution of tax 
burden and benefit falls equitably across London’s 
residents and businesses. Given London’s place in 
England and as capital of the UK, we have also 
considered how our changes would affect the rest of 
the country. 
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paRt 5, chapteR 1 
Distributional and  
equalisation mechanisms 
1. As stated in a number of places in this report, any proposals to reform the financing of 
London government create the inevitability of distributional consequences. If one or more 
taxes were transferred from central government to the GLA and/or the London boroughs, 
london government would have more income than before. such a transfer would be 
made with the object of increased accountability and transparency. if the transfer of 
taxation to London were substantial, it is possible the total level of tax income available to 
the capital’s authorities would exceed the existing total of tax-borne public expenditure. 
However, our proposals to transfer the control of property taxes to London would not 
amount to a sum greater than the total of existing GLA and borough expenditure. 
2. In order to ensure that the Exchequer, and thus other parts of the UK, did not lose out 
as the result of any transfer of taxes to London there would need to be an equivalent off 
setting reduction in the grants received by London. With a reform of taxation which led 
to a position where London’s local tax income exceeded existing tax-borne spending, it 
would be necessary for central government to transfer the responsibility for some services 
from the centre to london. on the basis of our proposals in this report it would not be 
necessary to make such transfers. 
3. This report is making more modest proposals than a transfer of income tax, at least in the 
short term. But we accept that at the point of making the transfer of, say, property taxes 
from the Exchequer to London government there would need to be a reduction in grant 
paid to the capital’s authorities. This off-set could be achieved either by reductions in the 
residual Revenue support grant or by changes to transport funding. a change of this kind 
has been made for all local authorities in 2013-14 to take account of the partial retention 
of business rates from april 2013. it would be easy enough for the dclg to adopt a similar 
approach to London finance reform.
4. Equalisation between local authorities in different parts of England, though not between 
England, Scotland and Wales, has long been a feature of grant mechanisms. Differences 
in assessed expenditure needs and also in taxable capacity have been moderated by 
differential grant payments. From 2013-14 onwards, equalisation will have a much-
reduced importance within the local government funding system. Authorities will generate 
additional resources by increasing their residential and business tax base, but not as the 
result of changes in needs or resources.
5. As stated above, the 2013-14 business rate reform provides a means for shifting taxes 
from central to local government without inter-area disruption. This is a means that could 
be adopted for any other transfer of taxes from the Exchequer to London. However, once 
a transfer had been made, there should be a Barnett Formula-style ring-fence around 
any further growth or contraction of the tax base within London. If the UK government 
periodically made adjustments to adjust for any ‘gains or ‘losses’ that occurred over time, 
the incentives provided by the reforms we suggest would be reduced or lost.
6. the balance of funding between england, scotland, Wales and northern ireland is not 
currently subject to any needs and resources equalisation. The Barnett Formula merely 
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adjusts the resources available to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland so as to reflect 
changes to the funding of England, taking account of changes in population. There 
have been no official estimates of changes in the expenditure needs or local taxable 
capacity of, say, Scotland in relation to England at any point since the Barnett Formula 
was created in the late 1970s. If London were similarly (to some extent) removed from 
england an analogous mechanism could easily, if desired, be put in place, such that london 
government can retain all the growth from its property tax base. 
7. It is interesting to note that HM Treasury’s figures, published in the annual publication 
Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses (PESA) show extraordinary stability in each nation 
and region’s share of UK public expenditure. Despite the enormous energy expended on 
local government, NHS and other funding mechanisms each year, there is little variation in 
the indexed share of public expenditure over time. This stability of resource distribution 
suggests it would be possible to create a longer-term settlement between Whitehall and 
london within which the gla and the boroughs could have greater freedom.   
8. If there were a transfer of one or more taxes from the Exchequer to London, particularly 
if the boroughs took responsibility for a new revenue source, there would almost 
certainly need to be measures in place to secure a degree of fairness from authority to 
authority within London. Some taxes are very unequally distributed from place to place. 
The GLA and the boroughs would have to put in place a robust and formal institution for 
handling any distributional issues that resulted from reforms to the tax system. In the 
past there was a London Rate Equalisation Scheme which was put in place to bring about 
redistribution from central boroughs to the rest. 
9. One of the advantages of England’s complex and much-reformed local government system 
is that civil servants have always found it possible to invent mechanisms to allow any 
degree of redistribution deemed necessary. Unfortunately the nature of such mechanisms 
tends to inhibit both accountability and transparency.
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paRt 5, chapteR 2 
Implications for wider London 
government reform
1. We have made a number of proposals to devolve taxes and other financial functions to 
London. If this were to occur, it would be necessary to make decisions about the allocation 
of new financial powers between the two parts of London government. 
2. Such an allocation would involve an agreement about what it would be appropriate for:
• the Mayor/GLA to determine alone
• the Mayor/GLA and boroughs to determine collectively
• the Mayor/GLA and groups of boroughs to determine collectively
• groups of boroughs to determine collectively
• individual boroughs to determine alone.
3. To secure formal and long-term agreement on such matters would require the 
development of new governance systems and structures that are sufficiently robust to 
cope with the variety of possible situations, but sufficiently simple to be efficient and 
without the need to invent additional structures as new and unforeseen situations arise. 
the purpose of such new governance arrangements is to provide assurance to all parts of 
London government and to increase effectiveness. It is possible to imagine some principles 
that should guide the creation of a system that meets these needs:
i.  Elected Leaders of all London local authorities and the London Mayor must have a 
stake in the success of london as a whole and all of london.
ii.  The system must ensure that no one borough or groups of boroughs can be excluded 
from the benefits of London’s success, or become powerless to address local needs.
iii.  the interests of the mayor cannot be over ridden by the boroughs, or vice versa.
iv.  The system must enforce binding decisions and these decisions must reflect a clear 
consensus. This is likely to require less than unanimity, but significantly more than  
50 per cent +1.
v.  The system must be broadly consistent with the sort of requirements central 
government might have in order to trigger such devolution.
The result of these principles is likely to be complexity and so a further principle will be 
needed in order to meet central government’s likely tests for good governance:
vi.  arrangements must either prevent or break gridlock in decision making in order that 
all London leaders are pre-disposed to find agreement.
4. governance systems are a means to an end and their value must be tested against that 
criterion. Local government has long experience of the challenges created by formula 
funding systems and the differing interests that they expose. With financial devolution 
these challenges are likely to re-emerge at the London level. The reason to consider 
governance now is to close off the risk that conflicting perspectives within London will 
undermine the additional value that can be created by financial devolution to London. The 
mayor and london boroughs will have to determine how new arrangements work and 
which level of government is responsible for the new, devolved taxes. It is likely the Mayor 
would have significant responsibility for stamp duty and any related new revenues relating 
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to high-value domestic taxation. The operation and retention of council tax and business 
rates would have to be operated in a way agreed between the mayor and the boroughs. in 
the longer term, similar agreement would be necessary if larger revenues such as income 
tax were assigned or transferred to London.
the role of the london asseMBly
5. As and when there is a significant reform of London’s funding, for example the transfer of 
one or more revenues from central to london government, it is possible there will need 
to be a review of the Assembly’s powers of scrutiny. If the Mayor assumed substantial 
additional taxation responsibilities it would be necessary to review the Assembly’s powers 
with a view to enhancing them.
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paRt 5, chapteR 3 
london within england
1. our commission, as its name suggests, was given a remit to consider the future of public 
finance in relation to London. But London plays such a significant role in any debate about 
the governance and funding of england, it is impossible to discuss it without taking note of 
the implications for the rest of the country. Indeed, changes to London’s partly-devolved 
position could affect the whole of the United Kingdom.
2. We have been conscious in our debates that the kind of proposals we make in our report 
could equally apply to other major cities. Greater Manchester has evolved an impressive 
city regional government model from which London can derive lessons. In particular, the 
greater manchester ‘earn Back’ arrangement, determined as part of the government’s 
City Deal policy has provided a precedent for London and other cities to make the case for 
a capacity to invest in order to generate additional tax revenues that can be held and re-
invested locally.
3. Thus, proposals made in this report to give London access to a larger share of national 
revenues could also be applied to Birmingham, greater manchester, the leeds city Region 
or other areas. Lord Heseltine’s report ‘No Stone Unturned’ made the case for a form of 
devolution to city regions. We very much agree with his views.
4. We are conscious of the need to present the case for strengthened financial autonomy for 
London as one which other cities, towns and counties can support. The proposals in this 
report would not take resources away from anywhere else in england. What is proposed 
is that some taxes should be transferred to London and that others should be made 
available should London authorities decide to introduce them. Those that are transferred 
would trigger a pound-for-pound reduction in central government grant, though new 
taxes introduced by London alone, as is the case with the congestion charge and the 
business rate supplement, would not lead to any adjustment. 
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paRt 5, chapteR 4 
conclusion
1. This report is not suggesting London should become a ‘city state’. The capital’s residents 
and businesses would continue to pay most of their taxes to the Exchequer. But, where a 
tax is transferred to London, we believe that any future growth or contraction in the tax 
base would be a matter for the capital. If the tax base grew faster than in the rest of the 
UK, London would be marginally better off than would otherwise have been the case. If 
the tax base grew more slowly than the UK average, the relative loss would be borne in 
london. such is the risk involved in local autonomy.
2. Giving London, or any other city, a larger local tax base would provide an incentive 
for the city to build up its tax base. This is the logic that lies behind the Government’s 
business rate reform, which took effect in April 2013. We believe that London authorities 
should also have greater freedom to determine tax rates, as is common in major cities 
internationally. The existing arrangements, where the GLA and the boroughs can 
only change local tax rates (beyond central government-imposed limits) by holding a 
referendum are not consistent with proper localism. In an era of tax competition, tax rates 
might go down or up. London’s elected politicians should have discretion to set the level of 
the taxes for which they are responsible. 
3. London will remain part of England and of the UK. But this continuing role within the 
country cannot mean there is no fiscal devolution. If London were given a bigger tax base 
and thus a greater incentive to drive economic growth, national tax revenues would also 
be higher. this is the prize for the country as a whole.
82
Raising the capital | the RepoRt of the london finance commission
Annexes
83
Raising the capital | the RepoRt of the london finance commission
annex 1 
Biographies
tony travers 
professor, department of Government, Lse
tony is an academic 
specialising in city and local 
government. he has been 
an advisor to a number of 
Parliamentary committees and 
was a member of the audit 
commission. he has also held advisory posts 
at the arts council, the King’s fund and on 
the finance working group of the Urban Task 
force. he is an honorary member of cipfa 
and of the IRRV.
JohN BiGGs 
london assembly Member for City & east
John is in his fourth term as 
assembly member for city and 
east london. he is a former 
leader of tower hamlets and 
has recently been selected 
as labour’s candidate for 
the Tower Hamlets Mayoral election in 
2014. he chairs the assembly Budget and 
Audit Committees. He has a keen interest 
in regeneration and his priorities this term 
include maximising the post-Olympic benefits 
for east london. 
roger Bright 
Former chief executive, the crown estate
Roger Bright is currently 
Deputy Pro-Chancellor of 
city University, london, a 
Board member of london 
first, a trustee of the 
heritage of london trust 
and chairman of the advisory Board of the 
public affairs company Curtin & Co. From 
1973 he occupied a variety of posts in the 
department of the environment, leaving 
the civil service in 1991 to become deputy 
Chief Executive of the Housing Corporation, 
and subsequently working at the Personal 
investment authority and its successor the 
financial services authority. he joined the 
crown estate as director of finance and 
Administration in 1999, becoming Chief 
Executive in 2001, a post he held for 10 years 
until he retired in 2011. 
Chris duffield 
Former town clerk and chief executive of  
the City of london
Chris Duffield has worked in 
london government for over 
thirty-five years. He was Chief 
Executive of the City of London 
for nine years. prior to that, he 
worked for authorities including 
the greater london council and two london 
boroughs, where he undertook the roles of 
both Chief Executive and Director of Finance.
Mike eMMeriCh 
chief executive, New economy manchester
prior to joining new economy, 
mike was director of the 
Institute for Political and 
economic governance at the 
University of manchester and 
Dean of External Relations 
in the Faculty of Humanities. Before this, 
he pursued a career in the political and 
economic strategy sectors, at the centre for 
local economic strategies where he served 
as principal consultant and then deputy 
Director from 1991 to 1996. After a period as 
a management consultant at Ernst & Young 
in 1997, he became a policy adviser with 
hm treasury before becoming senior policy 
adviser in the prime minister’s policy Unit.
84
Raising the capital | the RepoRt of the london finance commission
steve freer 
chief executive, cipFa
steve freer has been cipfa’s 
Chief Executive since 2000. 
previously he had worked for 
three large local authorities – 
Birmingham, Nottinghamshire 
and Warwickshire – and in 
management consultancy. he has been 
involved in several prior reviews of local 
government finance. He was a member of the 
Balance of funding Review chaired by nick 
Raynsford (2003/04), an adviser to Sir Michael 
Lyons’ Inquiry (2004/07) and a member of the 
city finance commission chaired by sir stuart 
lipton (2011).
niCk holgate 
town clerk and executive director of 
Finance, Royal Borough of Kensington  
and Chelsea
nicholas holgate has worked 
at the Royal Borough since 
2008. Before that he worked 
in hm treasury, mainly on 
public spending, and in the 
department for culture, media 
and sport. 
stePhen hughes 
chief executive, Birmingham city council
stephen hughes became chief 
Executive of Birmingham 
city council in may 2006. he 
has seen local government 
finance from all sides as policy 
advisor to local government 
organisations, running finance in Islington, 
Brent and Birmingham and seconded to the 
department for the environment, transport 
and the Regions managing Council Tax 
Business Rates policy. 
aLexaNdRa JoNes 
chief executive, centre for cities
Alexandra Jones has been 
Chief Executive of the Centre 
for Cities since summer 2010. 
prior to this, she led ideopolis, 
the Cities team at The Work 
Foundation. She has over ten 
years of experience working with national 
and local policymakers and with business 
to develop economic strategies. she has 
managed projects with a range of public and 
private sector clients on issues including the 
knowledge economy, public service reform, 
management and human capital. previously, 
Alexandra worked as a private secretary 
for the permanent secretary at the former 
Department for Education and Skills and as a 
researcher at the ippR. 
GeRaLd JoNes 
Former chief executive, wandsworth 
Council
Gerald retired at the end of 
2010 after 24 years as Chief 
Executive of Wandsworth 
Council. After an early career 
of some seven years in the 
city and then the mining 
industry he moved to haringey council in 
1972 and then on to Wandsworth in 1974 as 
an assistant director. he became director of 
Policy Analysis and Administration in 1981 
and Deputy Chief Executive in 1983, before 
moving onto the role of Chief Executive.
sir stuart liPton 
partner, Lipton Rogers
sir stuart lipton has been 
a commercial developer 
since the late 1960s and 
has been responsible for a 
number of large regeneration 
projects. he was the 
founding chairman of the commission for 
architecture and the Built environment and 
has been a board member of the National 
theatre and the Royal opera house. he 
85
Raising the capital | the RepoRt of the london finance commission
chaired the city finance commission and 
more recently the independent review of 
Tottenham after the riots.
teresa o’neill 
vice Chair of london Councils
councillor teresa o’neill 
has been the leader of the 
London Borough of Bexley 
since May 2008. In addition 
she is also Vice Chair (and Lead 
member for health) at london 
councils, a member of the lga improvement 
& Innovation Board and Mayoral Advisor for 
Outer Borough Relations. 
JuLes pipe 
Chair of london Councils
Mayor Jules Pipe has been 
chair of london councils 
since June 2010, and Mayor 
of hackney since 2002. he has 
overseen the transformation 
of council finances and the 
delivery of council services in hackney 
over this time, reflected in rising resident 
satisfaction with the council, and the area as 
a place to live. 
niCk raynsford 
MP for greenwich and woolwich
nick Raynsford is mp for 
greenwich and Woolwich. as 
Minister for London (1997-
1999) he was responsible for 
the greater london authority 
act, establishing the mayoralty 
and London Assembly. His subsequent 
Ministerial responsibilities included Housing 
and Planning (1999-2001), Local and Regional 
government and the fire service and london 
Resilience (2001-2005). He chaired the 
Balance of Funding Review in 2003-04 and he 
now chairs the Centre for Public Scrutiny.
Ben rogers 
director, centre for London
Ben Rogers is a writer, policy 
analyst and director of centre 
for london, which he founded 
in 2011. he was previously 
associate director of ippR 
and has led strategy teams 
at haringey council, dclg and the prime 
Minister’s Strategy Unit. He is a visiting 
research fellow at the Royal society of arts. 
Bridget rosewell 
senior partner, volterra partners
Bridget Rosewell is an 
economist who has advised 
on the prospects for the 
london economy over many 
years and was chief economic 
adviser to the gla from 2002 
to 2012. she is a founder and senior partner 
of Volterra Partners and a non-executive 
director of network Rail and of Ulster Bank. 
Martin sMith 
chief executive, ealing council
Martin Smith is Chief Executive 
of ealing council. ealing serves 
a rapidly growing population 
of over 300,000 people – one 
of the largest in london and 
one of the most diverse in 
the country. Martin leads on the efficiency 
agenda on behalf of the Chief Executives of 
london’s Boroughs. he is an unashamedly 
proud londoner.
86
Raising the capital | the RepoRt of the london finance commission
annex 2 
terms of Reference
PurPoses
The Mayor of London established the Commission to help him improve the tax and public 
spending arrangements for london in order to promote jobs and growth. 
The Mayor wants the Commission to examine the potential for greater devolution of both 
taxation and the control of resources (capital and revenue) to achieve this goal. 
overall aPProaCh
The Commission will hold an initial inquiry and report its findings by Spring 2013. 
Subsequent work by the Commission or others may then be requested by the Mayor 
depending on its findings. 
oBJectives
The objectives of the initial inquiry of the London Finance Commission are to: 
• Describe and assess existing arrangements for government funding for London, including 
capital and revenue (and the relationships between the two, e.g. in PFI and borrowing 
powers available to local authorities). This exercise should assess how they compare to 
other countries, regions and cities internationally and in the UK and how revenues raised 
are distributed locally, regionally and nationally.
• Examine the relative scale and distribution of London’s public expenditure, within the 
context of the wider South East region, with a view to considering the plausibility of a 
‘Barnett Formula’ style settlement for the capital. 
• Examine options for change, including the potential to devolve to London’s elected 
leaders both more of the taxes Londoners and London businesses pay and greater 
control over public expenditure decisions. Appropriate checks, balances and 
accountabilities will apply and the roles of the different tiers of local government will be 
considered. 
• Set out the benefits (with particular regard to promoting jobs and growth) and costs, 
and advantages and disadvantages, of lead options and make recommendations. 
sCoPe 
the scope of the review will not be limited other than by the purposes set out above. the 
Commission may consider all taxes raised and government expenditure incurred within 
London and make recommendations as it sees fit for improvements in accountability and 
local control. 
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MeMBershiP 
Membership of the Commission is: 
Chair: 
Professor tony travers london school of economics
Members: 
John Biggs london assembly member for city & east
roger Bright Former Chief Executive, the Crown Estate
chris duffield Former Town Clerk and Chief Executive, City of London
Mike emmerich Chief Executive, New Economy Manchester
steve freer Chief Executive, CIPFA
nick holgate Town Clerk and Executive Director of Finance, Royal Borough 
of Kensington and chelsea
steven hughes Chief Executive, Birmingham City Council
alexandra Jones Chief Executive, Centre for Cities
Gerald Jones Former Chief Executive, Wandsworth Council
sir stuart lipton partner, lipton Rogers
teresa o’neill Vice Chair of London Councils
Jules pipe chair of london councils
nick raynsford mp for greenwich and Woolwich
Bridget rosewell Senior Partner, Volterra Partners
Ben rogers director, centre for london
martin smith Chief Executive, Ealing Council
ex officio members:
Jeff Jacobs Head of Paid Service and Executive Director, GLA
ed lister GLA Chief of Staff and Deputy Mayor for Planning
dr gerard lyons chief economic advisor to the mayor of london
observers:
steve allen managing director, finance, tfl
martin clarke Executive Director, Resources, GLA
John o’Brien Chief Executive, London Councils, London Councils
Jeremy skinner senior manager, economic and Business policy, gla
Clerk to the Commission:
Julia harrowsmith Senior Policy Officer, Economic and Business Policy, GLA
seCretariat and resourCes
the gla will provide the secretariat to the lfc and will convene working and stakeholder 
groups as appropriate. GLA resources (and external support where necessary) will be made 
available to help the commission to carry out necessary research. london councils’ research 
base will, by agreement, be accessed.
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rePorting and tiMetaBle
The key milestones of the initial inquiry are expected to be as follows: 
• July 2012: Commission meets for the first time to agree its Terms of Reference and 
commission its initial inquiry work
• December 2012: draft interim report
• Spring 2013: final published report
Thereafter, depending on conclusions and recommendations, an implementation timetable 
may then be set. 
aPPendix: relevant Mayoral Manifesto CoMMitMents
The Mayor’s manifesto committed to the establishment of a London Finance Commission to: 
• “examine existing and propose revised funding arrangements for the capital to put funding 
sources on a secure long-term footing; examine whether it is time we should keep more of 
the taxes Londoners pay in London (a ‘devo max’ solution similar to that being considered 
for Scotland)”
and to: 
• “monitor revenues raised from people and businesses in Greater London and review their 
distribution, use and the comparative financial outcomes for Londoners compared to others 
in the UK, and providing the data needed to ensure that Greater London gets a fair deal.”
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annex 3 
London’s tax and spending
This annex summarises London’s recent and projected financial contribution to the UK, the 
make-up of its expenditure and taxes and the uses and sources of public sector funding in the 
capital. 
London has been a substantial net contributor to public finances. Oxford Economics have for 
many years researched the capital’s contribution for the City of London demonstrating that:
“From the turn of the millennium up to the start of the economic crisis, London contributed 
a surplus of between £10 billion and £20 billion towards the UK budget balance. During the 
crisis of 2008/09 this narrowed substantially, although on our estimates even during the worst 
financial year of the current economic downturn, London’s fiscal account only just went into 
deficit…before rebounding to around £5 billion the following year (2010/11). Only the South 
East of England and the East of England have matched London in delivering a consistent fiscal 
surplus.” 65
exPenditure
On the expenditure side, London’s share of public expenditure has remained remarkably 
stable over time as the chart below shows. Total expenditure increased (as a share of UK 
public expenditure) from 13.7 per cent in 2001/02 to 14.5 per cent in 2003/04 but has 
remained virtually flat over the last ten years. This masks some variations, but major areas of 
expenditure, health, education and public order and safety have remained very stable over the 
last decade.
Overall expenditure per head in London is higher than the UK average (see Table 3) and is 
higher than other statistical regions in transport, public order and safety, and health and 
education, but just below the average for enterprise, employment and social protection. 
table 3: identifiable expenditure by function (2010/11) in London, the uK and  
the Rest of the uK (£ per capita)
Public order 
& safety
enterprise & 
employment 
policies
transport health education & 
training
social 
protection
total 
identifiable 
expenditure 
on services
greater 
london
843 136 774 2210 1730 3567 10198
UK 542 131 368 1948 1458 3717 9199
Rest of 
the UK
498 130 309 1911 1419 3739 9055
Sources: PESA 2012, ONS and GLA Economics calculations
however, london is the only region that mostly comprises a metropolitan area; this represents 
a significant difference from all other regions in UK statistics, which contain a mixture of urban, 
suburban and rural areas. The average expenditure per head across the Greater South East 
65 Oxford Economics, ‘London’s Finances and Revenues’, (http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/business/economic-research-and-
information/research-publications/Pages/Londons-finances-and-revenues.aspx) 
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(the closest approximation to London’s functional economic region) is £8550, which is below 
the UK average of £919966. Therefore comparing expenditure per head in London with other 
regions is misleading; using a more consistent comparison (ie public expenditure on the Greater 
South East as a whole), expenditure per head would actually appear to be below the average 
for the UK as a whole.
PuBliC exPenditure as a ProPortion of london’s eConoMy
Research also shows that public expenditure in London as a proportion of its GVA is low 
compared to other regions as shown in Table 4. In particular, capital investment as a proportion 
of GVA is very low, as shown in Table 5. 
table 4: Public spending as a per cent of london or uk gva
66 PESA 2012 and GLA Economics calculation.
greater london uk
1999/00 30.5% 41.8%
2000/01 30.7% 42.9%
2001/02 31.3% 43.9%
2002/03 32.6% 44.7%
2003/04 32.6% 45.3%
2004/05 32.8% 46.2%
greater london uk
2005/06 32.6% 46.7%
2006/07 31.9% 46.3%
2007/08 31.2% 46.1%
2008/09 32.5% 48.8%
2009/10 35.3% 52.7%
2010/11 35.0% 52.3%
Source: Oxford Economics (December 2012), London’s Finances and Revenues, City of London Corporation
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table 5: expenditure on selected services in London, the Greater south east and the uK 
in 2010 /11: total, current and capital in levels (£ million) and as a per cent of regional or 
national Gva
greater london greater south east uk
level % of gva level % of gva level % of gva
Public order & 
safety
total 6593 2.4% 12186 2.1% 33724 2.6%
current 6204 2.2% 11490 2.0% 31415 2.4%
capital 389 0.1% 697 0.1% 2309 0.2%
enterprise & 
employment 
policies
total 1064 0.4% 2301 0.4% 8131 0.6%
current 952 0.3% 2041 0.4% 6464 0.5%
capital 112 0.0% 260 0.0% 1668 0.1%
transport total 6059 2.2% 10005 1.7% 22901 1.7%
current 2411 0.9% 3578 0.6% 9462 0.7%
capital 3648 1.3% 6427 1.1% 13440 1.0%
health total 17290 6.2% 41884 7.2% 121305 9.2%
current 16556 5.9% 40147 6.9% 115855 8.8%
capital 733 0.3% 1736 0.3% 5450 0.4%
education & 
training
total 13539 4.9% 32212 5.6% 90761 6.9%
current 1690 0.6% 18123 3.1% 10325 0.8%
capital 11849 4.3% 14089 2.4% 80436 6.1%
social protection total 27913 10.0% 74639 12.9% 231431 17.6%
current 27744 10.0% 74208 12.8% 230106 17.5%
capital 170 0.1% 432 0.1% 1110 0.1%
Sources: PESA 2012, ONS and GLA Economics calculations
tax
On the tax side, London makes a greater contribution to the national finances largely because 
of its sectoral make up. It specialises in more highly paid and more profitable sectors, 
especially financial and business services, reflected in higher income tax (London contributed 
23.2 per cent of the UK total in 2010/11), business rates (23.4 per cent) and corporation tax 
(25.4 per cent). 
FutuRe pRoJectioNs
London is projected to remain a net contributor to public finances under current assumptions. 
Its proportion of UK tax and public expenditure is anticipated to grow and its surplus likewise. 
sourCes of funding
Despite London’s tax surplus, it receives most of its income from central government, 
as shown in Table 6. In 2011/12, government grants accounted for 73 per cent of local 
government expenditure in the capital (the GLA and boroughs), while council tax provided 
only 12 per cent of local resources. The majority of public service expenditure is managed by 
central government (58 per cent). 
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table 6: sources and uses of funding in london local government
capital and Net current (Revenue) expenditure
 Central 
government
gla london 
Boroughs
london local 
government
total Public 
sector 
expenditure
 £ million £ million £ million £ million £ million
defence 13  – – –  – 
Economic Affairs  490  5,106  963  6,069 6,559 
Education  5,242 0 8,263 8,264 13,506 
Environment protection  185 36 1,004 1,040 1,226 
general public services 141  54  910  965 824 
health 17,247 – –  – 17,247 
housing and community 
amenities
613 9 1,458 1,467 2,079 
public order and safety  2,254 3,833  81 3,914 6,168 
Recreation, culture and 
religion
 697 107  651 758 1,455 
Social protection 19,486 – 10,305 10,305 29,790 
grand total 46,087 9,145 23,635 32,780 78,867 
funded by:
Council Tax  –  935 3,019 3,954 3,954 
grants (inc government 
and other contributions)
 – 4,954         18,869         23,822        23,822 
capital Receipts  –  48  489  537  537 
Revenue Contributions  – 1,941 583  2,524 2,524 
Borrowing: supported – – 118  118 118 
Borrowing: Unsupported –  1,267 557  1,825 1,825 
General Taxation 46,087 –  – – 46,087 
total 44,509 5,715 20,428 32,780 78,867 
Source: London Councils67
67 This table was based on the Government’s Public Spending Statistics for 2011-12. This included the Country and Regional Analysis 
2012, which provides a further level of public spending analysis by country, region, and function. The regional analyses presented 
in the Government release show where the individuals and enterprises that benefited from public spending were located; it does 
not mean that all such spending was planned to benefit a particular region. The analysis is limited to identifiable expenditure 
for London, which accounts for 86 per cent of total expenditure on services. The expenditure has been classified in ten broad 
categories, as defined by HM Treasury in its public spending statistics. Using the HM Treasury figures as a baseline for London, 
the data was cross referenced against information from DCLG’s Revenue Outturn (RO) and Capital Outturn Report (COR) data for 
2011-12. This provided further information on the level of expenditure incurred by the GLA and the London boroughs and the City 
of London. Where the amount of total expenditure was higher than that recorded by London local government it was assumed 
that the remaining spend should be attributed to central government. A full reconciliation between these individual returns and 
HM Treasury statistics has not been possible. However, it is felt that these figures do serve to illustrate, in broad terms, the level 
of expenditure across the various tiers of government in London and where it is spent.
London Finance Commission
City Hall, The Queen’s Walk
London SE1 2AA
www.london.gov.uk
020 7983 4564
